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“The reality is that we must find peace through strength.”










Introduction: the liberal hegemony

It has become all too popular in recent years to depict neoconservatism in the United States as a totally alien political concept, as if it were injected into American foreign policy from out of space. According to Joost Lagendijk en Jan Marinus Wiersma, two Dutch members of the European Parliament, “the neoconservatives had little influence in Washington [until the Indian summer of 2001]. Everything changed on September 11 of that year. [President George W.] Bush chose to change American foreign policy radically. The U.S. would no longer let itself be bound in its actions, including by allies. With or without support, Washington would actively go and seek ‘monsters’ to destroy. To sit and wait was not an option anymore.”​[1]​ The idea that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 preceded a dramatic change toward a moral imperialism and away from multilateralism, found fertile ground with those that held suspicions toward these ostensibly new tenets of U.S. foreign policy.
Many observers throughout the world regard with dismay the most obvious manifestation of this perceived U-turn: the Iraq War. This event has led some of them to reduce neoconservatism to the caricature of an imperialist conspiracy desiring to take over the world and its natural resources. According to the Washington Post, Western oil companies were already scrambling for a piece of the cake long before the Iraq War.​[2]​ Many, moreover, have complained that Jews and Israel have shaped American foreign policy rather than U.S. interests. Two famous scholars, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, have recently stirred up a heavy debate on this issue by writing that 

... the overall thrust of U.S. policy in the [Middle East] is due almost entirely to U.S. domestic politics, and especially to the activities of the “Israel Lobby.” Other special interest groups have managed to skew U.S. foreign policy in directions they favored, but no lobby has managed to divert U.S. foreign policy as far from what the American national interest would otherwise suggest, while simultaneously convincing Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially identical.”​[3]​

Now it has become clear that Iraq’s ousted president Saddam Hussein did not possess weapons of mass destruction, some bluntly accuse both the Bush administration and the neoconservatives of having lied in order to obtain people’s support for the war. In an attack on Tony Blair’s pre-war “assertion that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction,” Mary Wakefield of the British Sunday Telegraph did not spare the neoconservatives: “Perhaps, like Paul Wolfowitz and other neo-conservatives, [Blair] is a disciple of the political philosopher Leo Strauss. Strauss was a champion of the ‘noble lie’ – the idea that it is practically a duty to lie to the masses because only a small elite is intellectually fit to know the truth.”​[4]​ As three American observers have written, “The lies of this Administration concerning Iraq rise to the level of the greatest scandals in American history. Now it is time to clean up the mess and reinvigorate our democracy.”​[5]​ These commentaries reflect a rather hostile public opinion, but also reveal a failure to comprehend the complexity and intellectual roots of neoconservatism, regardless of the question whether or not the administration was right to invade Iraq.
The general academic debate, besides the recent discussion about Mearsheimer and Walt’s thesis, is less emotional than that among journalists and columnists in the mainstream media. Yet some scholars have drawn equally misleading pictures of neoconservatism and its actual impact on U.S. foreign policy. According to Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, today’s neoconservatives unite around the “belief deriving from religious conviction that the human condition is defined as a choice between good and evil.”​[6]​ Their assertion that “the fundamental determinant of the relationship between states rests on military power and the willingness to use it” is also but a caricature of reality.​[7]​
Finally, another well-known argument is that George W. Bush and neoconservatism alike are revolutionary features in foreign policy. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay conclude that the neoconservatives have helped bring about a “Bush revolution in foreign policy:” the President “relied on the unilateral exercise of American power rather than on international law and institutions to get his way. ... He depended on ad hoc coalitions of the willing to gain support abroad and ignored permanent alliances.”​[8]​ Anatol Lieven argues that “a messianic revolutionary attitude ... fuels self-righteous nationalist extremism in America,” and “the U.S. approach to democratization all too often combines rose-colored sloppiness of intellect with a bitter meanness of spirit towards specific countries that fail to measure up to American standards or demands.”​[9]​
“Iraq is the Waterloo of the neoconservatives,” Lagendijk and Wiersma argue.​[10]​ In some respect it might well be, as the administration is facing increasing setbacks. Recent polls show the President’s domestic popularity shrinking to a record low.​[11]​ The continuing chaos in post-Saddam Iraq and the absence of WMD have dealt a heavy blow to the neoconservatives’ legitimacy, both at home and abroad (where it was never big to begin with). Yet those who foresee a radical change back to normalcy will be proved wrong. Just as “9/11” did not cause a U-turn to an agressive and unilateral foreign policy in which “freedom” and “democracy” were the new keywords, the perceived failure of the Iraq War will not lead to another U-turn away from it. Neoconservatism does not come from out of space, but is deeply rooted in established American political currents. Accounts such as that of Lagendijk and Wiersma are likely a product of wishful thinking rather than historical analysis. They reflect the hope that the perceived sudden rise of neoconservatism will prove no more than a minor incident in the long run of American history.
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that two allegedly neoconservative features are, in contrast, constants in American foreign policy throughout the twentieth century. The first is the idea that spreading freedom and democracy globally will automatically result in global peace, since democracies are claimed not to fight each other. This “democratic peace theory” became a scientific theory in the 1970s and the 1980s thanks to the works of Dean Babst and especially Michael Doyle. However, it actually finds its roots in the liberal-internationalist writings of Immanuel Kant, who was also an inspiration for many generations of American politicians. Woodrow Wilson is, in this respect, a case in point. The second central feature ascribed to neoconservatism is a distrust of pluralism. This is not a new phenomenon in American politics either. For who prevented the United States from entering the League of Nations as early as 1920 if not the U.S. Senate? 
The roots of today’s neoconservatism become clearly visible when analyzing the historical presence of these two features, which have guided American liberalism for a long time. Although not always on the forefront, often countered by alternative views, and very often mixed with raw national interests, they have been apparent in most of the past hundred years of American history. Along with that notion, an ironic paradox emerges. Establishing the democratic peace is something Americans have always desired and what Kant more or less foresaw, albeit after many setbacks and much bloodshed. (He did not envision a “democratic peace” as such, but a “perpetual peace” among “liberal republics.” See next chapter.) Yet Kant most certainly did not hope for a single state to exercise a “benevolent hegemony,” which some neoconservatives would love to see the United States exercise.​[12]​ Rather, he thought that just regimes that respect the rule of law at home would also play by the rules on the international stage. A great number of twentieth-century U.S. administrations, then, have to some extent attempted to enforce Kant’s notion of the perpetual peace, but have loathed one very important aspect of it: international law. Pluralism, so despised by many Americans, to Kant was the means to an end, but also an end in itself. That irony has guided the neoconservatives, and many generations of politicians before them.
	To understand what Immanuel Kant and his present-day followers have contended precisely, we will start by analyzing the democratic peace theory in chapter II. Some critical observations regarding this theory we will address as well. In the following chapters we will closely examine different eras of twentieth-century U.S. foreign policy. The square-off between Woodrow Wilson and his opponents, notably Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, will receive much attention in chapter III. We will analyze the foreign policy during the administrations of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry Truman in chapter IV. An obvious return to hegemony and liberalism, after the 1970s period of detente with the Soviet Union, occurred during the Reagan administration. The 1980s also saw the first rise of neoconservatism. This period, and the second rise of neoconservatism after 9/11, will make up chapter V and VI.
	These cases are not chosen randomly. Liberal internationalism emerged as a dominant school of thought on the American political scene only when the U.S. emerged as an important actor on the international stage. Although liberals like Thomas Jefferson already pointed at the American exceptionalism as early as the late eighteenth century, in the whole of the nineteenth century American foreign policy was mainly conducted on Hamiltonian terms, implying a policy of disentanglement and aloofness from the Old World. The idea that the American projection of power would also benefit the rest of the world would hardly gain legitimacy until the twentieth century. The end of isolationism was marked by what Henry Kissinger calls the two “watershed presidencies” of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson.​[13]​ During World War II and the beginning of the Cold War Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry Truman were the ones who convinced a rather hesitant American public that Europe would need American help in order to fight first fascism and then communism. And finally, the influence of the neoconservatives on the two remarkable presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush led to a reappraisal of hegemonic liberalism, as opposed to the prudent realist foreign policy of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Henry Kissinger, and the more pluralist Wilsonian foreign policy of Jimmy Carter in the 1970s.








Immanuel Kant and the democratic peace

Where else to start but with the very founder of contemporary thinking on the global spread of liberalism? For Immanuel Kant may really be labeled the first liberal internationalist. Whereas John Locke and Thomas Hobbes before him had greatly influenced the establishment of liberal democracy in the United States, Kant was probably the first to believe that liberalism was actually spreading, and, therefore, that mankind was moving to a universal and permanent state of peace. This idea that history will some day come to an end, as Francis Fukuyama would phrase it nearly two centuries later, found very fertile ground with twentieth-century liberal-internationalist thinkers.
Born in Prussia in 1724, Kant wrote a large number of philosophical works, many of which had a great influence on modern-day Western philosophy. For our purposes, his famous 1795 essay Perpetual Peace is the most interesting.​[14]​ Perpetual Peace is essentially an imaginative universal peace treaty, with articles that in his eyes were strict conditions for the perpetual peace to become reality.
The first section of the essay “contains the preliminary articles of a perpetual peace between states.”​[15]​ There are six such articles, representing “merely Prohibitive Laws.”​[16]​ The preliminary articles say, for example, that no peace can last if states have secret reservations when adhering to “the Treaty of Peace”, “For, in that case, it would be a mere truce, or a suspension of hostilities, and not a Peace.”​[17]​ They forbid states from meddling in other states’ internal affairs, and dictate that all states abolish their standing armies. To Kant, standing armies only lead states to “outrival” each other, making them the cause for war rather than the means to fight it. Moreover, he thought “the using of [men] as mere machines and instruments in the hand of another” inhumane.​[18]​
Along with Hobbes (and, to some extent, with Locke), Kant was deeply suspicious of human nature, and thought that man would naturally go to war with his neighbors. “The state of Peace must, therefore, be established ... by Law,” he contended.​[19]​ The second section of his essay consists of three “Definitive Articles”, which give some insight in what kind of law he actually envisioned. The Second and Third Definitive Articles hold provisions on the way states treat other states and their citizens. Kant envisioned a “Federation of Free States,” or a “Pacific Federation,” that would include ever more states, and ultimately all states in the world. Furthermore, he foresaw a “universal Hospitality” in the way a state would treat another state’s citizens, which he called the “Cosmo-political Constitution.” These sets of rules by which both states and people would play, however, would not be guaranteed or enforced by some kind of world government. Kant feared that such a regime would end up becoming a tyranny. Rather, he thought that people living in the liberty of a republic would naturally seek a state of peace: “It is intelligible that a People should say: ‘There shall be no war among us: for we will form ourselves into a State, and constitute of ourselves a supreme legislative, governing and judicial Power which will peacefully settle our differences.’ ”​[20]​
For our purposes, the most important part of Perpetual Peace is, without a doubt, the First Definitive Article. This article holds that all states be republics if a global perpetual peace is ever to come about, for

... the consent of the citizens as members of the State is required to determine at any time the question, ‘Whether there shall be war or not?’ Hence, nothing is more natural than that they should be very loth to enter upon so undesirable an undertaking; for in decreeing it they would necessarily be resolving to bring upon themselves all the horrors of War. ... On the other hand, in a Constitution where the subject is not a voting member of the State, and which is, therefore, not Republican, the resolution to go to war is a matter of the smallest concern in the world. For, in this case, the ruler, who, as such, is not a mere citizen but the Owner of the State, need not in the least suffer personally by war, nor has he to sacrifice his pleasures of the table or of the chase of his pleasant palaces, court-festivals and such like. He can, therefore, resolve for war from insignificant reasons, as if it were but a hunting expedition.​[21]​

Kant distinguished republics from democracies, although he acknowledged that the two were usually confounded. He thought the former to be a state in which the executive power was separated from the legislative power, as opposed to the despotic state, in which laws were “laid down and enacted by the same power that administers them.” Remarkably enough, he saw democracy, in the strict sense of the word, as despotism. The rule of the majority would give the majority the power to rule over all within the state. This, in his eyes, “is a contradiction of the Universal Will with itself and with liberty.” The key in Kant’s work lies in the word “representative”: an autocracy or aristocracy could at least possibly be “in conformity with the spirit of a representative system. Thus Frederick the Great was wont to say of himself that he was ‘merely the highest servant of the State.’ But the Democratic Constitution, on the contrary, makes such a spirit impossible; because under it everyone wishes to be master.”​[22]​ To Kant, then, the real criterion was whether or not the state is liberal, with a separation of powers, equality, liberty, and respect for the rule of law and individual property. Neither of these aspects he thought possible if the people held direct power.
In this respect, one might fairly state that Immanuel Kant was inspired more by Hobbes, who envisioned a liberal state under a non-elected sovereign, than by Locke, who feared that a state’s ruler would have to be constrained by democratic checks and balances. This is ironic, in a way, given Robert Kagan’s famous essay on the transatlantic divide, in which he depicts these two philosophers as irreconcilable opposites.​[23]​ Yet Kagan is right with his basic premise that Kant did not share Hobbes’s rather cynical view on international politics. Hobbes pictured relations between states as driven by anarchy, caused by man’s eternal struggle for power. This structuralist world view became central in the classical realist school of thought. On the other end of the spectrum stands Perpetual Peace. For Kant’s landmark essay should most certainly be regarded as a strong piece of liberal internationalism, and more specifically, pluralism. His almost utopian world view, with a preference for a world in which state power would be constrained by international law, would make many Americans shudder, even – or especially – today.

Kant’s legacy in the twentieth century
This does not mean, however, that all Americans reject Kant’s ideas out of hand. In fact, the great philosopher, who died in 1804, almost two centuries later started to receive a renewed appreciation by, mostly American, academics. This revival started off despite the fact that contemporary history had shown that international law had severe limitations and was presumably unable to enforce peaceful behavior among states. The League of Nations designed by Woodrow Wilson had failed to prevent the world from descending into the most destructive war it had ever witnessed. By the middle of the twentieth century, moreover, most analysts had already abandoned their hope that the United Nations would do much better, given the fact that Cold War rivalries had completely paralyzed its most important body, the Security Council. In any case, the self-constraint Kant hoped states could be persuaded to display had proved futile.
	The revival of Kantian thought, therefore, placed a strong emphasis on one aspect of Perpetual Peace, namely the First Definitive Article, which requires that all states be republics if world peace is to be realized. In 1964, the sociologist Dean Babst first stated that statistical analysis showed that democracies generally do not fight each other.​[24]​ Others agreed, and went on to refine Babst’s thesis. In a famous 1983 essay, published in two parts in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Michael Doyle gave birth to a neo-Kantian democratic peace theory.​[25]​
	Doyle’s essay is an important critique on the way realists perceive state conduct: “They judge that international relations are governed by perceptions of national security and the balance of power; liberal principles and institutions, when they do intrude, confuse and disrupt the pursuit of balance-of-power politics.”​[26]​ One cannot help noting that this remark is all but personally directed at Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State in the early 1970s. Kissinger held the opinion that the Soviet Union pursued rational interests, like any state, and that the U.S. should seek to accommodate itself to the Soviet’s power. This notion that states universally act according to their self-interest, regardless of their regime, Doyle rejects out of hand. Instead, he turns his attention to “one of the greatest liberal philosophers, Immanuel Kant, for he is a source of insight, policy, and hope.”​[27]​
	Contemporary liberal states differ from monarchies or dictatorships in that they commit themselves to four essential institutions, Doyle says. First, they respect the juridical equality and other fundamental civic rights for all citizens. Second, their sovereigns represent the electorate. Third, they recognize private property. And fourth, “economic decisions are predominantly shaped by the forces of supply and demand,” not by “bureaucracies.”​[28]​ These elements of domestic rule by regimes have considerable consequences for their behavior on the international stage: “Even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another.”​[29]​ A liberal zone of peace, or what Kant called a “Pacific Federation,” “has been maintained and has expanded” throughout the past two centuries.​[30]​
	Like Dean Babst before him, Doyle finds evidence for his claims in statistics. Whereas “medieval and early modern Europe were the warring cockpits of states,” clearly the emergence of liberal regimes all over the continent caused the establishment of “a pacific union of these liberal states.”​[31]​ He points at the fact that the two World Wars were, above all, existential struggles between liberal and illiberal states, not among liberal states themselves. Addressing the realist critique that prudent politics in the Hobbesian anarchy of the international arena presumably explain these statistic facts, Doyle contends that the experience of the balance of power “did not prevent either France (Louis XIV, Napoleon I) or Germany (Wilhelm II, Hitler) from attempting to conquer Europe, twice each.” Furthermore, “some very new, black African states appear to have achieved a twenty-year-old system of impressively effective standards of mutual toleration.” This leads him to think that “Beliefs, expectations, and attitudes of leaders and masses should influence strategic behavior.”​[32]​
	The three types of peace that scholars have identified, namely empire, hegemony and equilibrium, cannot be applied to the liberal peace, Doyle argues, so some other force has to be at work. Yet he blames other liberal theorists for arguing too complacently that to ordinary citizens war would be economically costly and, therefore, irrational. For that does not explain why liberal states would go to war with non-liberal states.​[33]​ Immanuel Kant, for Doyle, in this respect “offers the best guidance.” Although Kant had envisioned “an ever expanding separate peace,” he had also warned that this “pacific union” would come about “despite republican collapses, backsliding, and war disasters.” The way Kant saw it, Doyle argues, these problems in bringing about the perpetual peace would “serve to educate nations to the importance of peace.” Kant did not set a timeframe, but merely pointed at the possibility of a liberal peace, which to Doyle makes it “a moral obligation” as well.​[34]​
	What causes this unprecedented state of peace among liberal states? For Doyle, states that respect the rule of law at home will also respect international laws among each other. Moreover, the cosmopolitan law Kant described in Perpetual Peace will also be respected, because the “cooperative international division of labor and free trade according to comparative advantage” leads states to realize that what Kant called a “universal Hospitality” is mutually beneficient. Although they might surely quarrel with their allies about deep differences of opinion, liberal states “are fundamentally different. It is not just, as the Realists might argue, that they have more or less resources, better or worse morale. Their constitutional structure makes them – realistically – different. They have established peace among themselves.”​[35]​
	In the second part of his essay, Doyle explains why liberal states so often seek confrontation outside their zone of peace. There are two general reasons. First, liberal states are caught in an anarchic realist world, and second, liberalism itself may “exacerbate conflicts in relations between liberal and nonliberal societies.”​[36]​ Doyle, writing during the heyday of the Cold War, divides the non-liberal world into the East and the Third World. Liberals may act agressively against the Soviets, because they “do not merely distrust what they do; [they] dislike what they are – public violators of human rights.”​[37]​ The same goes for the liberal zone’s questionable record of interference in the Third World: “Addressing the rights of individuals in the Third World requires ignoring the rights of states to be free from foreign intervention.”​[38]​ The fact that this policy of covert (or sometimes not so covert) interference often helped dictators into power and kept them there, he more or less accepts by stating that the communist alternative would have been far worse.
Yet Doyle would gently push for some more liberalism in liberal states’ foreign policy, by moving beyond realist geopolitics and basing policy toward other states on the nature of their regimes.​[39]​ In a 1986 article, he emphasized that even Kant was a bit divided on the question of intervention in the non-liberal world. Although the latter regarded wars against non-liberal enemies as unjust, “At the same time, Kant argues that each nation “can and ought to” demand that its neighboring nations enter into the pacific union of liberal states.”​[40]​ Few would see in this an explicit authorization for going to war, however. Hence, on this point Doyle appears to disagree with his inspirator when he contends that “liberal republics are ... prepared to protect and promote – sometimes forcibly – democracy, private property, and the rights of individuals overseas against nonrepublics, which, because they do not authentically represent the rights of individuals, have no rights to noninterference.”​[41]​ Indeed, whereas Kant believed that domestic liberalism and international pluralism would more or less automatically be adopted by ever more states, Doyle appears to be more of a solidarist, who would argue that sometimes liberalism needs to be enforced. For this point of view he would likely receive warm support of many compatriots.
	
The critics
In the two essays mentioned above, Michael Doyle does not yet solve for us the dilemma of liberalism versus democracy Immanuel Kant put forward in Perpetual Peace. The word “democracy” he does not use very often, probably a conscious choice, which he nevertheless does not justify. Rather, he seems to accept that the two terms more than often collide in real life. Two other well-known democratic peace theorists, Bruce Russet and John Oneal, make a different choice. In an article entitled The Classic Liberals Were Right, they distinguish between a “democratic peace” and a “liberal peace,” the former being the consequence of “institutions and practices of democratic governance,” and the latter of interdependence through trade.​[42]​ The liberal peace often incorporates its democratic counterpart.​[43]​ Yet in their entire article they use the word “democracy.” Just like Doyle, they seem to make no distinction between the different qualities and characters of the world’s democracies, as if they were all liberal according to how they define that concept.
Others have found such an analysis less than satisfying. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder argue that countries in a “transitional phase of democratization ... become more agressive and war prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states. In fact, states undergoing regime change in a democratic direction are about twice as likely to fight wars soon thereafter as are states that are not undergoing a regime change.”​[44]​ The examples Mansfield and Snyder provide as evidence for their thesis are, among others, the former Yugoslavia, the post-Soviet Caucasus, and the Indian-Pakistani war of 1999.​[45]​
Russet and Oneal rebuff that they “find no evidence that dramatic political transitions increase the risk of international conflict.”​[46]​ These different conclusions are likely products of similarly different interpretations of the cases under their scrutiny. Transition and democratization are, of course, not exactly measurable processes. Still, it is hard to avoid the comparison between Kant’s perception of democracy as despotism and the dramatic consequences of democratization in the former Yugoslavia. As John Mueller points out, foolishly designed electoral systems enabled Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic to gain parliamentary majorities while having won only a minority of the votes, and they were also in control of the media. Hypernationalism, Mueller argues, did not have such an immense appeal among Serbs and Croats, but was greatly exacerbated by, indeed, the hasty introduction of democracy.​[47]​ The trouble the American troops are facing in Iraq has also raised questions as to whether it is actually possible to spread democracy “through the barrel of a gun,” questions which are not insignificant for the purpose of this thesis.
Of course, post-Saddam Iraq will unlikely go and wage war on Iran or another neighbouring state. Nor were Croatia and Bosnia uncontroversially recognized as independent states. Yet these cases of fragile democracy are comparable in one important way: they are, or were, illiberal democracies. As Immanuel Kant would have argued, Fareed Zakaria writes that “the democratic peace is actually the liberal peace.”​[48]​ This is something Michael Doyle, too, has later acknowledged. In his 1997 book Ways Of War And Peace he agrees with Kant that “participatory polities – democracies – [are not necessarily] peaceful, either in general or between fellow democracies. Many participatory polities have been non-liberal.”​[49]​ Zakaria, then, hits the nail on the head when he notes that “The democratic peace is real, but it turns out to have little to do with democracy.”​[50]​ This notion has led some authors to conclude that the democratic peace theory is but “irrelevant.” Lawrence Freedman writes that it “does not do justice to the complexity of modern international affairs. ... Democracy comes wrapped in many packages, not always particularly liberal or stable.”​[51]​
Freedman’s pessimistic account itself, though, does not do justice to the obvious peaceful behavior among the liberal democracies within the West and even beyond. The statistics serving Doyle, Russet and Oneal seem rather convincing. Hence, a more persistent wave of criticism, questioning the actual value of those statistics, deserves careful analysis. David Spiro contends, in a correspondence with Bruce Russet in International Security, that “the number of wars between democracies is not statistically different from what random chance would predict. Both wars and democracies are rare, and that is why there are not many wars between democracies.”​[52]​ He accuses Russet of seeking out only the “politically relevant” cases, which in his eyes is objectionable, for who decides to what cases that criterion applies? In general, Spiro writes, “the case for the Liberal Peace is entirely dependent on tricky and highly contestable definitional issues. Russet consistently and across the board chooses definitions of key concepts and data and methods so that they always yield results favoring the Liberal Peace.”​[53]​
Examining four “near misses,” which are cases of democracies that almost went to war with each other, Christopher Layne concludes that “that realism is superior to democratic peace theory as a predictor of international outcomes. Indeed, democratic peace theory appears to have extremely little explanatory power in the cases studied.”​[54]​ Democratic institutions do not explain the democratic peace, Layne argues, for “If democratic public opinion really had the effect ascribed to it, democracies would be peaceful in their relations with all states, whether democratic or not.” Moreover, “decisional constraints embedded in a state’s domestic political structure” – checks and balances – are “not exclusive to democracies.”​[55]​
In Layne’s eyes, democratic peace theorists should account for three propositions: first, “public opinion should be strongly pacific.” Second, “policymaking elites should refrain from making military threats against other democracies.” And third, democracies should be prone “to accommodate each other in a crisis.” Assessing his four near misses, he contends that these propositions do not hold for any of the cases. Moreover, he carefully selected his cases so that they would include crises between states with a common history, language and culture (the 1861 Trent Affair and the 1895-96 Venezuelan Crisis, both between Britain and the U.S.), and between states with strong economic ties (the 1898 Fashoda Crisis between Britain and France, and the 1923 Ruhr occupation by France).​[56]​ These cases prove, to Layne, that the alleged causal link “between domestic structure and the absence of war between democracies” is false. In each of the four crises, “at least one of the democratic states involved was prepared to go to war.” Hence, he agrees with David Spiro that sheer chance, not their internal character, makes war between democracies unlikely.​[57]​
Although Christopher Layne presents strong arguments, like many critics of the democratic peace theory he does not address the current, unprecedented state of peace among the liberal democracies after World War II. For at least within the West such severe crises have not appeared in the last sixty years. Thomas Schwartz and Kiron Skinner may provide us with the only non-liberal explanation for why the West is so peaceful. They write that the Cold War bipolarity made the Western democracies “aim their weapons eastward, and pool their forces in a security organization – one sufficiently strong and integrated to block combat among them.”​[58]​ In other words, realist geopolitics kept them from fighting each other.
If Schwartz and Skinner are right, time may prove that even the tight cohesion among Western liberal democracies will erode, and that they eventually will descend into wars against each other. In fact, many analysts already have little hope for the transatlantic alliance’s future. “Abandoned by life, forgotten by death,” one Dutch journalist recently characterized the state of NATO.​[59]​ Yet even Robert Kagan, who contends that Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus, is impressed by the “perpetual peace” he says the European countries have realized among themselves: “In the economic and political realms, the European Union produced miracles. Despite the hopes and fears of sceptics on both sides of the Atlantic, Europe made good on the promise of unity.”​[60]​






Out of isolationism: Roosevelt and Wilson

From its independence from Britain until the early twentieth century, the United States was reluctant to engage in international affairs. A struggle between liberals and realists at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 became a symbol for the lack of consensus on the new nation’s conduct of foreign policy. On one side, Thomas Jefferson was the most ardent proponent of a Lockean Republican constitution with checks and balances between the different states making up America. A devout liberal, Jefferson from 1789 onwards consequently expressed deep sympathy for the cause of the French Revolution, a failure of which he feared “would retard the revival of liberty in other countries,” and make the French state fall “back to that kind of Halfway-house, the English constitution.”​[61]​ As Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson write, on foreign affairs Jefferson believed that “The logic of reason of state was the logic of monarchies, not of republics.” This Kantian conviction led him to argue, in Tucker and Hendrickson’s words, “that the security and well-being of the United States were inseparable from the prospects of free government everywhere.”​[62]​
In contrast, Jefferson’s great opponent Alexander Hamilton followed the much less “enlightened” Hobbesian logic of a powerful central state relative to the individual states when negotiating the Constitution. The stampedes in many French cities and the consequent Napoleonic Wars, moreover, he similarly regarded with much dismay. When the events of 1789 and beyond compelled President George Washington to formulate a position on whether its 1788 treaty with France against Britain was still valid, the two “Founding Fathers” publicly squared off on the issue. Jefferson, Secretary of State, was a clear proponent of maintaining the alliance, while Hamilton, Secretary of Treasury, was strongly opposed. Their public disputing led to a compromise within their cabinet, with President Washington making a statement of neutrality, but not suspending the treaty altogether. Thereafter, the two men remained symbols for the different approaches toward American foreign policy. The Americans, however sympathetic to Jefferson’s notion of American exceptionalism, were generally in favor of the Hamiltonian approach. Washington’s Farewell Address, written by Hamilton and calling for aloofness from the European continent, became “a benchmark for American foreign policy for more than a  century.”​[63]​ Even Jefferson later in his career went on being extremely hesitant to engage in European affairs, albeit more out of fear that the European influence on America would be corruptive.​[64]​ 
In the early twentieth century, this isolationist tendency gradually lost ground. “Two factors projected America into world affairs,” Henry Kissinger argues: “its rapidly expanding power, and the gradual collapse of the international system centered on Europe.” Two great presidents, in particular, led their country to its dominance on the international arena: Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. However, as we will read in this chapter, these men had rather different justifications for pushing the United States out of its stubborn isolationism.

Roosevelt’s conception of the balance of power
Only 42 years old, Theodore Roosevelt in 1901 succeeded the assassinated William McKinley as President of the United States, becoming the youngest President ever in U.S. history. By that time he had already enjoyed a twenty-year-long career in the public service. That was rather unusual, for in the late nineteenth century most Harvard graduates such as himself did not opt for a life in politics. Nor did Roosevelt, who ran for the New York Assembly in 1881 only with great reservations: “Don’t think I am going to go into politics after this year,” one biographer quotes him. In the words of the latter, however, “Roosevelt made a career of politics, studied and mastered politics, because Roosevelt loved power.”​[65]​
If that assessment holds true, this personal desire for power may well have manifested itself in the role he wanted the United States to fulfill in the world. Roosevelt was a student of the balance of power, a concept which, to him, in the early twentieth century was no longer conceivable without America participating in it. American national interests, therefore, demanded an increasingly expansive foreign policy.​[66]​ His admiration for this old-style European diplomacy he most likely developed during his remarkably extensive traveling and working in Germany, France, and Great Britain. Consequently, as Howard Beale has put it, “he brought to the White House ... a direct knowledge of the world that no previous president save the Adamses, Jefferson, and Monroe had possessed.”​[67]​
	According to his biographer John Morton Blum, Roosevelt had to crush two “grand illusions” held by the Americans. The first was that their country was “self-insulated” and could avoid being involved in world affairs. The second was that “peace, or at least the absence of war, was a normal condition.”​[68]​ For a nation that had adhered to these beliefs since its birth, it was hard to come to terms with the fact that the technological changes of the time automatically altered international relations, particularly the foreign relations of the hitherto very isolated United States.​[69]​
Deeply suspicious of international law, the keyword in Roosevelt’s long career, as both a writer and politician, was “preparedness.” Unwilling to subordinate his nation’s interests to those of other powers, he, more than any of his predecessors, depended on American military strength to safeguard and strengthen its position. As he one time made clear to the Congress, “it is contemptible, for a nation, as for an individual, to ... proclaim its purposes, or to take positions which are ridiculous if unsupported by potential force, and then to refuse to provide this force.”​[70]​ Shortly before becoming President and after he had just survived a dispute within the Republican Party, he wrote to a friend: “I have always been fond of the West African proverb: ‘Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.’”​[71]​ “Big stick diplomacy” later became the catch-phrase for the assertive foreign policy that derived from these premises, especially with regard to Latin America.
As a young man, Roosevelt came to be an admirer of the navy thanks to two uncles, who had served as officers in the American Navy, and in the Confederate Navy during the Civil War. As an undergraduate student, he already started his book A Naval History of the War of 1812, which less than five years later was used as a textbook in many colleges.​[72]​ His love for maritime warfare was reinforced by his close friendship with the great naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan. The British sea battles against Napoleon inspired this navy captain to write a series of books that laid the foundation for modern sea power theory. In short, Mahan called for an overwhelmingly dominating sea power as the means to win naval wars. Taking the “command of the sea,” he noted,

is not the taking of individual ships or convoys, be they few or many, that strikes down the money power of a nation; it is the possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from it, or allows it to appear only as the fugitive; and by controlling the great common, closes the highway by which commerce moves to and from the enemy’s shores. This overbearing power can only be exercised by great navies.”​[73]​

	Mahan’s work was a driving force behind the British naval buildup prior to World War I.​[74]​ Moreover, his policy advice for the United States in particular, namely that it should “focus on gaining naval supremacy, controlling sea-lanes, and vigorously developing foreign markets,”​[75]​ found fertile ground with proponents of an expansive foreign policy in the 1890s. The “splendid little war” between the U.S. and Spain of 1898 over Cuba, and the acquisition of the Philippines in that same year, were the first results of their activism on the American political scene.
Hence, when Theodore Roosevelt accepted the presidency in 1901, his country was at a crossroads: “America had to choose what course she would pursue.”​[76]​ On one side were the several anti-imperialists in the Congress and even his administration, who contended that the colonial projects in the Carribean and the Pacific were neither in American interest nor morally justified. On the other side were politicians such as Roosevelt himself and Henry Cabot Lodge, who had been Roosevelt’s instructor at Harvard and later became Senator as well as his personal friend. These men wanted the United States to stay on the course it had hesitantly followed throughout the 1890s, and conduct an even more expansive foreign policy than it had done so far.​[77]​ America’s choice, therefore, had already been made with Roosevelt’s rise to power.
	By 1890, Roosevelt, Lodge and also Mahan had already begun to exchange their ideas. In that same year, they had to exert great pressure to save Mahan from being sent on sea duty, so that he could continue his political lobbying. His work consisted of lectures to high military officers and publishing books and articles for the public, some of which became bestsellers. This way the three men were able to reach and influence significant parts of the American elite. Lodge, and other friends of Roosevelt, moreover, were “powerful members of the Senate.”​[78]​ In the eyes of the rather leftwing, anti-imperialist historian Howard Beale, four factors urged “Roosevelt and his friends” to take such an “imperialist” stance. First, they were vigorous nationalists, “impelled by national pride.” Second, the notion of American exceptionalism led them to believe that their country always acted rightly. Third, they held a racial “sense of Anglo-Saxon superiority to peoples over whom [they] were extending [their] rule.” And fourth, they were driven by “a special brand of national honor,” which, if things did not turn out as they desired, led them to react “like a child determined to have his own way and to resort to fisticuffs if thwarted.”​[79]​
	Although unequivocally hostile to Roosevelt’s foreign policy, this account holds true to some extent. Throughout the 1890s, the Monroe Doctrine had already been invoked as a warning to keep Britain from projecting its power onto Central America. In his 1904 “Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt certainly seemed to provide Beale with evidence for his claims:

Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may lead the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. ... Our interests and those of our southern neighbors are in reality identical. In asserting the Monroe Doctrine, ... we have acted in our own interest as well as in the interest of humanity at large.​[80]​


If this were the whole truth, however, surely Roosevelt would later have never received so much appraisal by that American champion of prudent, amoral realism, Henry Kissinger. Kissinger argues in his Diplomacy that although “America’s leaders might continue to insist that its basic foreign policy was to serve as a “beacon” for the rest of mankind, ... some of them were also becoming aware that America’s power entitled it to be heard on the issues of the day, and that it did not need to wait until all of mankind had become democratic to make itself a part of the international system. ... No one articulated this reasoning more trenchantly than Theodore Roosevelt.” Roosevelt, according to Kissinger, viewed the world in terms of power and interests. Rather than seeing the country over which he presided as an “incarnation of virtue,” he “started from the premise that the United States was a power like any other power.” Although he certainly believed in American exceptionalism, “he did not believe that it could preserve the peace or fulfill its destiny simply by practicing civic virtues.”​[81]​
If we are to believe Kissinger, muscular diplomacy on the Western Hemisphere to Roosevelt was but the manifestation of the United States assuming its natural role in the global balance of power. He played this role with vigour. Even before his Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine of 1904, the U.S. had already forced Haiti to become financially independent from European banks. It stirred up and supported the Panaman insurrection against its Colombian rulers in 1904, after it had seized control over the area necessary to dig the Panama Canal. It occupied Cuba in 1906, to restore order after an anti-government revolt led by general Enrique Loynaz del Castillo. With respect to European affairs, the 1906 Algeciras Conference made clear that the President was prepared to give up commercial interests in order to support France and Britain against what he perceived to be the greatest threat to the balance of power: Germany.​[82]​ All this went hand in hand with an unprecedented naval buildup, started already when Roosevelt was Secretary of the Navy under his predecessor as President, McKinley. This enormous project by 1907 had made the United States the second strongest naval power in the world, behind Britain only.​[83]​
Kissinger’s realist account of Roosevelt’s foreign policy is easily reconcilable with Beale’s moral rejection of it. The Corollary, in Beale’s eyes, smacked of moral arrogance, paternalism, and racism (although he never used that word). To Kissinger, all that was mere rhetoric, in order to pursue a bigger goal, namely maintaining a delicate balance of power. Labeling Roosevelt a realist, he expects him to have conducted an amoral foreign policy. Indeed, he contends that “Roosevelt taught an especially stern doctrine for a people brought up in the belief that ... there is no difference between personal and public morality.”​[84]​ In Kissinger’s opinion, Roosevelt did what America’s interests demanded, regardless of whether those actions were morally just in the eyes of the public, or in his own. This view is shared by Blum: “Encumbered though it unhappily was by moralistic platitudes prodigiously repeated, his foreign policy advanced realistic principles.”​[85]​
In spite of all this downplaying of the moralism in Roosevelt’s foreign policy, however, it is hard to deny its importance altogether. For his twentieth and twenty-first century followers have not rarely interpreted his policies differently from the way these realists have. In particular, two well-known neoconservatives, Robert Kagan and William Kristol, view the former President as an example to follow. To these men, Roosevelt 

... aspired to the greatness of America, and he believed that a nation could only be great if it accepted its responsibilities to advance civilization and improve the world’s condition. ... Roosevelt was an idealist of a different sort. He did not attempt to wish away the realities of power, but insisted that the defenders of civilization must exercise their power against civilization’s opponents.​[86]​

With great approval, finally, they cite Roosevelt’s words that “Warlike intervention by the civilized powers would contribute directly to the peace of the world.”​[87]​ The contrast with the two former accounts by Beale and Kissinger could hardly be bigger.
Most likely Kissinger is closer to the truth when he argues that Roosevelt practiced liberalism only rhetorically. Nevertheless, the comparison with the writings of Michael Doyle is clear. For how radically different is Doyle’s assertion that “Addressing the rights of individuals in the Third World requires ignoring the rights of states to be free from foreign intervention,”​[88]​ from Roosevelt’s words that “Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may ... ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation?”​[89]​ Indeed, some signs of early solidarism seem visible when reading Roosevelt’s speeches. Even Kissinger writes that Roosevelt believed in the American exceptionalism, and its potentially universal appeal. That he applied his principles only in cases where American interests were at stake, should not be surprising. It is, after all, the kind of idealism which many recent administrations have also been practicing. The liberal impact of Roosevelt’s presidency, however, is unmistakable.
Yet it would go too far to link Roosevelt to Immanuel Kant or the neo-Kantian democratic peace theorists any further than we have already. According to Kagan and Kristol, “he had contempt for those who believed the international environment could be so transformed as to rid the world of war.”​[90]​ In the end, Roosevelt would have never contended that a democratic, liberal peace was possible, let alone a perpetual one. It would take another great President to bring the concepts of liberalism and internationalism together: Woodrow Wilson.

President Taft and the Republican split
When President Roosevelt left office in March 1909, even though he could have run for a third term, he thought he could trust his successor to keep following his expansive foreign policy. During the Roosevelt presidency, William Howard Taft had been Secretary of War, leaving office to become Civil Governor of Cuba after America’s military intervention of 1906. Running for President as Roosevelt’s protege in 1908, Taft had been warmly supported by his boss, who had told him that he “would be the greatest president, bar only Washington and Lincoln.” Taft, in turn, assured Roosevelt: “I can never forget that the power that I now exercise was a voluntary transfer from you to me.”​[91]​
With regard to his policies in Latin America, Taft followed up on his gratitude. During his four-years presidency, he intervened in the political affairs in Nicaragua several times. For the region as a whole, he also developed his well-known “dollar diplomacy,” consisting of the agressive extension of U.S. investments in underdeveloped regions. This policy is not rarely pejoratively labeled “dollar imperialism,” since the economic dependency it generated allegedly made it impossible for Central American countries to pursue policies to which the U.S. would object.​[92]​
	On other issues, the two men started to clash. For one, Taft wanted his country to engage in arbitration of international disputes, believing that would be the key to ending wars. A self-styled promoter of world peace, in 1911 he signed a number of treaties on international arbitration with Great Britain and France, much to the disappointment of Roosevelt. Suspicious as they were of international law, Roosevelt, Mahan and Lodge saw little merits in the treaties. If anything, arbitration in their eyes “could be used as a convenient escape hatch to allow a nation to retreat from an untenable or embarrassing position without loss of face.”​[93]​ Hence, the only respect they had for the treaties was based on their realist world view, and had nothing to do with adhering to international law. The world was not a “gigantic Sunday School or Free Library,” Roosevelt’s friend Arthur Lee noted, but a place of “wild passions and fierce hatreds in which good men and good nations must move warily and well armed.”​[94]​
Roosevelt would express later to his son: “[Taft] is a flabby fool in domestic matters, but he is an even flabbier and more incompetent fool in foreign affairs.”​[95]​ Nevertheless, their widening views on domestic issues were the most important factor in driving the two friends apart. Taft, like Roosevelt, initially was a proponent of major tariff reductions, and in 1909, he pushed a bill through the House of Representatives to cut tariffs drastically. Subsequently, the protectionist Senate made as many as 847 revisions to it, leaving trade barriers increased rather than cut, and was able to convince the President to go along with the amendments.​[96]​ To make matters worse, the 1910 mid-term elections ended in a dramatic result for the Republicans, causing a mutiny by the Progressive wing of the party. Roosevelt, heavily disappointed by what Burton Yale Pines labels Taft’s “flip-flop on tariffs,”​[97]​ decided to challenge Taft by accepting a nomination for the 1912 presidential elections. At the June 1912 Republican National Convention, however, the majority of party members, not sharing Roosevelt’s predisposition for low tariff barriers, elected Taft as the Republican candidate. Having implicitly announced beforehand that he would leave the party and run for President on a new ticket should he lose, he made good on his promise and founded the Progressive Party, taking with him many senior Republican Party members.​[98]​
Roosevelt’s step would dramatically change the course of American foreign policy. Leaving Taft behind him in the 1912 elections, he nevertheless split the conservative vote, allowing the Democratic candidate Woodrow Wilson to be elected President. In 1913, hence, a man came to power who shared Theodore Roosevelt’s ambitions with regard to an active role for the United States in the world, but who came to these beliefs from very different premises. Wilson was convinced of the universal appeal of freedom and democracy, and demanded that his country do whatever was in its might to spread these values. He was as much an interventionist in the Western Hemisphere as his two predecessors, but, instead of pursuing economic interests, he believed that American “benevolent interventionism” would be welcomed by the people subject to it.​[99]​ Finally, he would go into history as the President who failed to convince a hesitant American public of the merits of the League of Nations.

From neutrality to war
A son of a prominent Presbyterian minister, Wilson had been raised with the belief, in Kendrick Clements’ words, “that service to others was a Christian duty that could be fulfilled in political life as well as in the church.”​[100]​ Moreover, he was only a young boy when the dramatic events of the Civil War unfolded. This catastrophe inspired him, both as a student and a leader, to reunite the nation through building patriotism. Believing that patriotism is “the duty of religious men,” he said in 1917 that “We are to be an instrument in the hands of God to see that liberty is made secure for mankind.”​[101]​ Like many Protestants in the early twentieth century, he truly believed that the American exceptionalism, proclaimed by most of his predecessors, was actually a gift of God, and burdened Americans with the duty to spread its virtues.​[102]​ 
	For all his religious inspiration, Wilson was a well-educated man. In 1885, he completed a Ph.D in history and political sciences at Johns Hopkins University. Very familiar with the dynamics of politics, he held distinguished ideas about the American practice of democracy. As if prophesizing about the life of his great predecessor as President, Roosevelt, Wilson thought that the political leaders of the future should be “college-bred men” rather than businessmen turning to politics in a later life. The way he saw it, their skills would have the “advantage ... professional athletes have over amateurs.”​[103]​ Although he had a lot of respect for what business leaders achieved in business, to him it remained commerce, not politics. It would indeed be the way of the future.
Political crises in the young nation, like the Civil War and the deadlock in the 1874 presidential elections between Hayes and Tilden, provided Wilson with energy. In a 1879 article in National Review, he called for the introduction of a parliamentary government according to the British model. His argument in the article, which was followed up by an 1885 book called Congressional Government, was that the checks and balances in the American Constitution had completely paralyzed the government. Since Congress was too much involved in day-to-day administrative tasks, it failed to embark upon debating the country’s most important and urgent issues. In contrast to conservatives, who blamed democracy’s ineffectiveness on universal suffrage, Wilson believed the system was not representative enough. He thought these problems fixable, not insurmountable. For, more than anything, the President who came to power in 1913 had the reputation of having a strong, indeed religious belief in the virtues of democracy.​[104]​
History was, by then, about to take a dramatic turn, as hypernationalism was pushing the European continent into an all-out war. Despite his ideological preferences, however, Wilson at first did not take sides in the conflict. When the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, and Serbia’s so-called lack of cooperation in investigating the murder, was considered a casus belli by Austria, the United States refrained from taking any action or even a stance. When millions of men were preventing themselves from becoming canon fodder in muddy trenches, it remained passive. One reason for Wilson’s passiveness was that the fatal illness of his wife Ellen was leaving him devastated, and kept him from even fulfilling his routine obligations, let alone the leadership required in a time of crisis: “Day and night he sat at her side,” Clements writes, “holding her hand and willing her to live, and when she died on 6 August he was near collapse.”​[105]​
On August 19, when the Parisians were already able to hear the explosions and gunfire being unleashed fifty miles away, Wilson finally made his first statement as to what course the U.S. would pursue. As it turned out, its role would remain very limited. For the President feared that

... the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinion, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion if not in action.
Such divisions amongst us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace ... I venture, therefore, my fellow countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men’s souls.​[106]​

	Surely engaging in the European conflict would have stirred up emotions at home. (In fact, it did so in 1917.) Yet a general unwillingness of the American people to become entangled in the Old World’s affairs undoubtedly also played a role. According to one 1914 survey conducted among American newspaper editors, “105 editors indicated they [held sympathy towards] the Allies, 20 favored the Central Powers, and 242 designated no preference.”​[107]​ While Roosevelt had managed to convince the American public of the necessity to break with its isolationist mood, entering the war in 1914 would still have been a revolution in American foreign policy. Parallel to Roosevelt’s internationalist efforts, moreover, an increasing peace movement had emerged in the United States after 1900. The founding of Andrew Carnegie’s Endowment for International Peace was an example of this new activism, and Wilson and also Taft were closely linked to it.​[108]​
	Meanwhile, Roosevelt, who after his defeat in the 1912 elections had gone on a scientific expedition in the Brazilian jungle and had returned home with serious tropical disease, started a second life as a public intellectual, writing books on several topics and campaigning vigorously for the Republican Party. The former President was little sympathetic toward Wilson’s stance with regard to the war. The German invasion of Belgium in August 1914 “deserved swift punishment,” Roosevelt concluded. The President’s negotiations with the Germans about their submarine warfare in the Atlantic, he found too weak. The sinking of the British ocean liner RMS Lusitania by a German submarine, killing 128 American citizens, should have been followed by breaking all relations with Germany, according to Roosevelt. A student of the balance of power, he came to the conclusion that the German hostility was threatening the European equilibrium, and therefore the security of the United States.​[109]​
	Yet also Roosevelt was careful not to upset the deeply divided American public. While Wilson was still preoccupied with the difficult negotiations with the Germans about their submarine policy, Roosevelt never publicly stated what he actually wanted: going into the war. The things he did demand were a tougher stance against the belligerent Emperor Wilhelm II, and for the U.S. to prepare itself militarily:

If, as an aftermath of this war, some great Old World power or combination of powers made war on us ..., our chance of securing justice would rest exclusively on the efficiency of our fleet and army ... No arbitration treaties, or peace treaties, ... no tepid good will of neutral powers, would help us even in the smallest degree. If our fleet were conquered, New York and San Fransisco would be seized and probably each would be destroyed as Louvain was destroyed...​[110]​

Wilson’s re-election of 1916 left Roosevelt outraged. Wilson, who had campaigned with the slogan “He kept us out of the war,” was a “Byzantine logothete,” with a soul “rotten through and through,” he yelled. The American people had elected him only because they “had no ethical feeling ...; they weren’t concerned with honor of justice or self-respect; they were concerned for the safety of their own carcasses...”​[111]​
If this was so, the Americans would not get what they wanted. In fact, already early in the war the American neutrality was actually not so strict as it seemed, since many rich Americans were granting loans to the Allied powers, which were generally used to purchase American arms and ammonition.​[112]​ Nevertheless, just after the Lusitania was torpedoed by the Germans, a horrified Wilson spoke to an audience of newly naturalized immigrants: “[The] example of America must be the example, not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world, and strife is not.”​[113]​ As his biographer puts it, “It was not that he believed war would be a catastrophe in itself ... He feared that by becoming a belligerent the United States would lose its moral standing and its power to contribute to a just peace.”​[114]​ For the time being, both Roosevelt and his sparring partner Wilson were careful not to lure the nation into an all-out war, albeit for very different reasons. For the former, his rhetoric was political rather than principal, since he realized he had to be careful not to upset the American public. For the latter, his words were principal, but he was surely helped by the fact that he had the public on his side.
But these hesitations could not but lose ground as time went on. The incident with the Lusitania was a first sign that the United States might not remain safe as the German imperialism continued to gain momentum, as Roosevelt feared. Between August and December 1915, the Germans torpedoed three more British ships, again killing some Americans. These events strengthened Anglo-American ties, and also made Wilson aware that the size of the American military was dangerously small. In 1914, the U.S. army had been roughly as big as Mexico’s or Belgium’s, much to the dismay of many of its high-ranking officers.​[115]​ “I believe in peace,” Wilson explained, “But I know that peace costs something, and that the only way in which you can maintain peace is by thoroughly enjoying the respect of everybody with whom you deal.”​[116]​
The military buildup was supposed to reinforce Wilson’s credibility in his role as negotiator. In early 1916, the administration initialed a memorandum calling for a peace conference between the Allies and the Central Powers, with the U.S. as a mediator. Should the Germans refuse to attend, or should the belligerents attending the conference fail to agree on a peace settlement, the U.S. would “probably” enter the war. (“Probably” was Wilson’s addition to the proposal, since he did not have the power to go to war without Congress approval, nor the will to do so anyway.)​[117]​
However, relations with Germany would improve. An incident on March 24, in which another ship, the Sussex, was sunk, and which again infuriated the President, led to a statement by the Germans that their submarines would from then on adhere to international law. The administration even accepted this pledge with delight, dramatically easing the American-German tensions. At the same time, the administration’s efforts with regard to the peace conference seemed to be thwarted by the allies, since the Germans stated, after Britain rejected the American initiative, that they would have been willing to attend it. This led Wilson to send the British government a note in which he wrote that to him the two sides’ war aims were “practically the same,” thereby understandably upsetting the British.​[118]​ 
As time would prove, there was more to Wilson’s relativism. A known opponent of “militarism,” he warned in 1916 that “If you are determined to be armed to the teeth, you must obey the orders and directions of the one man who can control the great machinery of war. Elections are of minor importance ...”​[119]​ It was exactly this image that filled him with horror, because he feared it described the future of the United States itself. Balance-of-power politics, and specifically the German threat, Wilson feared, would endanger America’s ability to avoid becoming a militaristic state. Since both sides of the war thwarted his efforts to conduct a peace settlement, he accused both Germany and Britain of “push[ing] the conflict to a conclusion in order to make themselves secure in the future against its renewal and against the rivalries and ambitions which brought it about.” This strategy would have great long-term consequences, Wilson feared: “We see it abundantly demonstrated in the pages of history that the decisive victories and defeats of wars are seldom the conclusive ones.”​[120]​ The lawless character of the balance of power, lacking any international security regime, to Wilson encouraged militaristic power politics. Hence, he despised the balance of power because, just like Jefferson a hundred years earlier, he thought it would corrupt democracy in the United States itself.
In private, though, Wilson increasingly saw Germany as the militaristic agressor that caused the war, denouncing the Germans as “wild beasts.”​[121]​ Two events finally led the U.S. into war. On January 31, 1917, Germany announced that, in spite of its promises, it would resume unrestricted submarine warfare, in which no ships would be spared, including those of neutrals. On February 28, moreover, intelligence intercepted a telegram from German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmerman to the Mexican government, in which he proposed an alliance, basically luring Mexico into a war to regain the territory it had lost in 1847.​[122]​ In a speech to Congress on April 2, Wilson stated his reasons for intervening in the European conflict. Reciting extensively the incidents involving German submarines and the loss of innocent lives they had caused, the President stated that Germany was waging
 
... a war against all nations. ... The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. ... Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the political might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion. ... [Armed] neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable. ... it is practically certain to draw us into the war without either the rights or the effectiveness of belligerents. ... I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States; ... and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German empire to terms and end the war.​[123]​

Military victory alone, however, would not be enough to secure the future security of the United States. “Our object,” he spoke, “is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power ...” Making clear that the U.S. had “no quarrel with the German people,” he went on to state that this 

... was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools. Self-governed nations do not fill their neighbor states with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest.
... A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. ... We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. ... We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. ... We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind.​[124]​


The Kantianism of Woodrow Wilson
Dispatching troops overseas proved to be not so easy for the American army. For the first time a U.S. government drafted men for military service, much to the horror of many Americans. Moreover, a shortage of ships meant that the young men drafted could not even be sent to France instantly. In little more than a year, however, no less than two million American troops were fighting at the European front lines. They had the advantage that the belligerents were already exhausted, so their fresh contribution was ultimately able to tip the balance in favor of the Allied forces.​[125]​ On November 11, 1918, the Germans were forced to sign an armistice, bringing an end to a war that had been unprecedented in its magnitude. Approximately 1.6 million French troops, 800,000 British troops, and as much as 1.8 million German troops had lost their lives.​[126]​ Compared to these numbers, the casualty toll for the Americans, 116,000 killed and 204,000 wounded, was rather limited.​[127]​
	Wilson saw the end of the war as an opportunity to fulfill his own wartime goals. As his “peace without victory” speech of January 22, 1917 had made clear, these were very ambitious:

The treaties and agreements which bring [this war] to an end must embody terms which will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged. ... The elements of that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of the American governments, elements consistent with their political faith and with the practical convictions which the peoples of America have once and for all embraced and undertaken to defend.​[128]​

Hence, the peace Wilson envisioned was one built upon law similar to that of the United States. This required, however, that the upcoming peace be

... a peace without victory. ... Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor’s terms imposed upon the vanquished. ... Only a peace between equals can last. The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchange must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak.​[129]​

The President’s cocktail of Immanuel Kant, democratic peace, and the American exceptionalism was horrifying to Roosevelt, who labeled the link between a crusade against autocracy and a peace between equals a “nauseous hypocrisy.”​[130]​
In January 1918, the President delivered his famous Fourteen Points, which, if implemented, basically implied a revolution in international relations. The Points consisted of calls for open diplomacy “in the public view,” freedom of the seas, self-determination for all peoples, and free trade, as well as many territorial issues. The key Point was the final one: “A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”​[131]​ It was to be the starting point of his efforts to establish the League of Nations.
In Henry Kissinger’s words, Wilson “put European diplomats on thoroughly unfamiliar terrain.” Balance-of-power politics had led them to argue against self-determination, since new, smaller nations would be inexperienced and might magnify ethnic rivalries. Again in Kissinger’s words, to Wilson “it was not self-determination which caused wars but the lack of it; not the absence of a balance of power that produced instability but the pursuit of it.” Peace had become a legal concept, and the way to preserve it was the establishment of a new international institution. It was “a complete reversal of the historical experience and method of operation of the Great Powers.”​[132]​
The Versailles peace conference convened from January until June, 1919. America’s Allies, who during the war were so desperate for American help that they did not dare questioning his visions openly, after the armistice cautiously started to express their reservations about Wilson’s objectives. Especially France, which realized how weak it had become in comparison to Germany, and that it would never be able to counter a German military revival, insisted that the Allied powers invoke several punitive measures against the defeated Germany. David Lloyd George, Great Britain’s representative at Versailles, had stated before the peace conference that the Germans would pay for the full costs of the war, and that “we will search their pockets for it.”​[133]​ Wilson, unwilling to push for German reconciliation, granted some of France’s demands, in the event trading his principals for the establishment of the League of Nations. In the end, Germany, which was not present at the peace conference, was shocked by its outcome, while France was not reassured by its provisions.​[134]​
The League of Nations concept was based upon the novelty of collective security, with its members agreeing to resolve their conflicts strictly peacefully. Agressors could in theory face economic and military sanctions, forced upon them by unanimous resolutions of a Council, which consisted of five permanent members (Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States) and four non-permanent members. Next to the Council and an Assembly, the League also consisted of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The League guaranteed the sovereignty of states, but any bilateral agreements they would make were binding only after registration with the League Secretariat, and had to be published, in accordance with the notion of “open diplomacy.” Wilson assumed that state sovereignty would be constrained by the League’s rules of conduct.​[135]​ In theory, at least, the great powers had agreed upon a utopian way of conducting their international relations.
The League of Nations was the world’s closest experience with the ideas of Immanuel Kant thus far. In some respects, Kant would surely have disapproved of both the new organization and Wilson’s politics in general. For one, he would never have appreciated the latter’s strictly democratic zealotry, since he saw democracy as despotism rather than a blessing. Democracy, to Kant, was deeply illiberal, and in stark contrast to what he called a “liberal republic.” Moreover, the League’s authority would to Kant have smacked of being something of a “world government,” a notion he equally despised, as he feared that would itself end up being a tyranny.
Yet the philosopher and the politician were not so radically different from each other. As we have seen, Kant believed that a nation with a representative government would naturally choose peace, not war. Wilson’s conception of democracy was nothing other than the twentieth-century fulfillment of Kant’s representative liberal republic, and he similarly expected democratic states to behave peacefully. For Kant, liberalism and democracy were two concepts which would not naturally go hand in hand. Yet in Wilson’s days, they had proved to actually do so in many cases. Either through a supranational authority or through “rational” choice, both men expected representative states to display self-constraint in their actions. This was, as Kissinger would contend, a departure from classical realist balance-of-power politics. His beliefs made Wilson the greatest twentieth-century promoter of the democratic peace theory, a title he arguably preserved throughout the remainder of the century.
Wilson’s dream, however, would not be realized. Already prior to the Versailles peace conference, his advisers had warned him that he could not afford to be away from Washington for so long. In 1919, traveling to Europe took a week, meaning he would not be coming home in between, which deteriorated his strength in Congress.​[136]​ This would ultimately prove fatal to the Versailles Treaty, because men such as Henry Cabot Lodge started to lobby vigorously against ratification of the treaty, even as Wilson was still in Paris.
On July 10, 1919, Wilson presented the treaty to the U.S. Senate. “The United States,” he said,

entered the war upon a different footing from every other nation ... We entered it ... only because we saw the supremacy, and even the validity, of right everywhere put in jeopardy and free government likely to be everywere imperiled by the intolerable aggression of a power which respected neither right nor obligation and whose very system of government flouted the rights of the citizens against the autocratic authority of his governors.​[137]​

This rather Kantian notion led Wilson to recite again the merits of the League. The European powers, he spoke, like himself had come to conclude 

that what they were seeking would be little more than something written upon paper, to be interpreted and applied by such methods as the chances of politics might make available if they did not provide a means of common counsel which all were obliged to accept, a common authority whose decisions would be recognized as decisions which all must respect. ... [F]leets and armies had been maintained to promote national ambitions and meant war. ... [N]o other policy meant anything else but force, force, – always force. ... The united power of free nations must put a stop to aggression, and the world must be given peace.​[138]​
	
	Whether the Europeans were really that enthusiastic about the treaty, is very doubtful. In any case, the Senate was not. The debate about ratification of the treaty clearly revealed its reservations. The leading opponent of ratification was Roosevelt’s friend and Senator Lodge. Roosevelt himself had died of embolism on January 6, 1919, but had shortly before stated, in reaction to Wilson’s plans: “I trust nothing but our own strength for our own self-defense.”​[139]​ The reservations held by Lodge, at the time Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, were a little more elaborate. In a short, famous speech to the Senate, he laid out his views: 

I am as anxious as any human being can be to have the United States render every possible service to the civilization and the peace of mankind. But I am certain that we can do it best by not putting ourselves in leading strings, or subjecting our policies and our sovereignty to other nations. ... And when I think of the United States first in an arrangement like this, I am thinking of what is best for the world. For if the United States fails, the best hopes of mankind fail with it. ... The United States is the world’s best hope, but if you fetter her in the interest through quarrels of other nations, if you tangle her in the intrigues of Europe, you will destroy her powerful good, and endanger her very existence. Leave her to march freely through the centuries to come, as in the years that have gone. Strong, generous, and confident, she has nobly served mankind. Beware how you trifle with your marvelous inheritance – this great land of ordered liberty. For if we stumble and fall, freedom and civilization everywhere will go down in ruin.​[140]​

If one would strip away the rhetoric about the American exceptionalism, little more than plain realism remains. Yet, like Roosevelt and many Americans after him, Lodge linked American power and interests to the interest of the world as a whole. American hegemony, rather than pluralism, would make the world more secure, if not at peace. Wilson, of course, was “unable to understand why such doubts should be entertained.”​[141]​ In response to demands by the Senate that the treaty be changed on some key points, he retorted: “We go in upon equal terms or we do not go in at all; and if we do not go in, my fellow citizens, think of the tragedy of that result – the only sufficient guarantee to the peace of the world withheld!”​[142]​
However, whether his opponents in the Senate were isolationists, realists, liberals, or liberals only in rhetoric, they all shared a deep suspicion toward subjugating their country to an international organization. In fact, even the President’s confidant Colonel Edward House felt that the nation would only entangle itself in traditional alliances, especially since the U.S and Britain had, parallel to the Versailles Treaty, signed a treaty with France that they would come to its assistance in the case of renewed German agression. In his diary, House wrote: “The League is supposed to do just what this treaty proposed, and if it were necessary for the nations to make such treaties, then why the League of Nations?”​[143]​ This notion was a reversal of the arguments presented by realists, but it implied a similar reservation: that the League of Nations would be unable to end the practice of “old politics,” for if it would function, these extra guarantees toward France would be unnecessary.
Wilson failed to convince the Senate to ratify the Versailles Treaty. After a no-vote on November 19, 1919, the treaty again failed to gain the required two-thirds majority in the Senate on March 19, 1920. With 39 votes in favour and 35 against, it finally rejected ratification. This was undoubtedly partly a consequence of bipartisan politics. The Republicans had taken control of the Senate in the 1918 mid-term elections, but were denied a voice at the peace conference and possibilities to make changes to the treaty. Nevertheless, their arguments had historical roots in established schools of thought in American foreign policy. Wilson, who had won the 1919 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to establish the League of Nations, had suffered an immense political defeat. His health being deteriorated after a heavy stroke in late 1919, he spent his final year in office rather inactively, and died in February 1924.
Henry Kissinger writes that, although the Senate denied American participation in the League, Wilson set an important precedent: “Though Wilson could not convince his own country of its merit, the idea lived on. It is above all to the drumbeat of Wilsonian idealism that American foreign policy has marched since his watershed presidency, and continues to march to this day.”​[144]​ Kissinger is only partly right, however. As far as America’s aspiration to spread democracy is concerned, it has remained unmistakenly Wilsonian. Yet the other, pluralist part of Wilson’s policies can hardly be said to have remained dominant. Had Kissinger written Diplomacy after the diplomatic crisis over Iraq of 2002 and 2003 instead of 1994, he would probably have put it differently. In a 2003 editorial in an Australian newspaper, he describes the transatlantic rift as a mutual “resentment [brought] to the surface under the banner of unilateralism and multilateralism,” the United States being the unilateralist.​[145]​ Indeed, Kissinger seems to have altered his views somewhat, although he never mentions any historical context for President Bush’s foreign policy.







Roosevelt, Truman, and the dawn of the Cold War

The fate of the League of Nations thus turned out to be doomed from the start. It soon became clear that the United States would not enter it, and that it could not prevent Europe from returning to power politics (if it had ever parted from its old habits in the first place). In fact, only on two issues, minority rights and the mandate system, the League had some success.​[146]​ It was to be cold comfort, as the harsh punitive measures against Germany and an economic crisis were bringing extreme ideologies to the forefront of the European continent. Just two decades later, the world stood at the eve of an even greater war than the one Wilson had labeled “the war to end all wars.” Hence, the League had failed dismally to provide what it was established for, and the Versailles Treaty as a whole had but reinforced German grievances.
	For the Americans, World War II started out as another war centered on the European continent. After Wilson’s presidency had ended, the nation had slowly slipped back into isolationism. Wilson’s successor in the White House, Warren G. Harding, had stated in 1923 that the League, as far as the U.S. was concerned, was “as dead as slavery.”​[147]​ For all the international commerce and its interest in foreign affairs, the American public again proved unwilling to take any responsibility for keeping the peace, and again was keen to avoid becoming entangled in Europe’s political affairs. Some students of American isolationism have, therefore, concluded that America’s departure from aloofness under Roosevelt and Wilson “had been more apparent than real.”​[148]​ For, as The New Republic put it in 1919, Europe’s choice to once again revert to power politics “must be their affair. It certainly should not be America’s affair in the sense that American lives and American interests are entangled in it.”​[149]​ This attitude was reinforced by the emergence of conspiracy theories regarding the “real” origins of America’s participation in the war. Wallstreet bankers, the argument went, had pressed the White House to intervene in the war to save the loans they had granted to the Allies.​[150]​
	In 1933, a man came to power in Washington who, like his uncle Theodore but unlike many of his predecessors, was a real cosmopolitan. Introduced to Europe at the age of three, Franklin Delano Roosevelt spent a couple of months in France, Germany and Britain every year between the ages of seven and fifteen. By the time he left highschool in 1900, he already had shown to be a staunch proponent of an active and leading role for the U.S. in the world, views he strengthened during his studies at Harvard. For a while, he abandoned his father’s political preferences by joining the Harvard Republican Club, and his admiration for Theodore, whom he visited a number of times in the White House, was enormous. He nevertheless ran for New York state legislature on behalf of the Democrats, and quickly thereafter, for state Senator. His political activism and support for Woodrow Wilson’s presidency, led the latter’s Secretary of the Navy to invite him to become his Assistant Secretary, an offer he accepted with delight.
Although Roosevelt shared with his elder cousin a love for the navy, he saw this position as a stepping stone rather than an end point in his, still short, career.​[151]​ Only in his thirties when he accepted the job, he took on his new role with great self-confidence. He was well-acquainted with the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, and had come to believe, in Robert Dallek’s words, that “a major American role in world affairs would serve both the national well-being and the needs of backward peoples around the globe.”​[152]​ This view often put him at odds with his colleagues in the Navy Department, who, in the first years of World War I, never abandoned their neutral stance, nor their unwillingness to put the navy in a state of alert.​[153]​
Yet, as the world was gradually sliding back into all-out war in the 1920s and 1930s, Roosevelt seemed not to follow up on his beliefs. In fact, when he became President in 1933, he made clear in his Inaugural Address that his priorities lay with countering the “dark reality of the moment” at home, even at the cost of international trade relations: “Our international trade relations, though vastly important, are in point of time and necessity secondary to the establishment of a sound national economy. I favor as a practical policy the putting of first things first.”​[154]​ This implied putting in practice his well-known economic “New Deal” policies of extensively recruiting people in the public sector, as advised by the influential progressive economist John Maynard Keynes. The state of the economy was also the main subject of Roosevelt’s second Inaugural Address, which held not a single reference to international affairs.
	For all his emphasis on domestic affairs, however, Roosevelt did not practice total isolation. The largest international challenge the newly inaugurated President had to face was the issue of disarmament. At the Geneva Conference for disarmament talks in March 1933, he made great efforts to reach a deal with the great powers. At that point, he saw “Germany as the only possible obstacle to a Disarmament Treaty,” and made some reluctant commitments toward reassuring French security by opposing German prototype weapons production.​[155]​ While Roosevelt’s commitment to disarmament made the British and the French enthusiastic, the Germans continued to demand that they be allowed limited rearmament and the right to keep building prototype weapons, putting the talks in deadlock. In a follow-up summit in London in May, Roosevelt urged the representatives to come to an agreement to eliminate offensive weapons. In response, Hitler assured the representatives that Germany sought neither war nor rearmament, but, in Dallek’s words, merely an “equality of rights through disarmament among all states.”​[156]​ The administration reluctantly agreed, but made a general statement that it would consult and aid other states in the case of aggression by one nation. This rather hollow promise ended up receiving a wave of criticism from the Senate, which balked at anything smacking of a departure from neutrality.​[157]​
A mere five months later, Hitler announced that Germany would retreat from the Geneva Conference and the League of Nations.​[158]​ Although it led Roosevelt to become very pessimistic about his chances of success, he did not want to give up altogether. As one of his cabinet members stated, “Disarmament is a bear which one holds by the tail and no one no matter how discouraged may let go.”​[159]​ In a speech at the Woodrow Wilson Foundation in late 1933, Roosevelt still found the courage to praise his predecessor Wilson and the success of the League of Nation. In his eyes, it were but a few leaders standing in the way of world peace: “It is but an extension of the challenge of Woodrow Wilson,” he stated, “for us to propose in this newer generation that from now on war by governments shall be changed to peace by peoples.”​[160]​ This was an outright referral to the democratic peace theory.
Yet the President’s faith in the ability of pluralism to provide peace and security had, without a doubt, severely been diminished. The next few years, Roosevelt continued to engage in disarmament negotiations, but the lack of any real progress left him little hopeful, especially after Japan in late 1934 withdrew its commitment to the 1922 Washington Treaty for naval arms control. Although Roosevelt continued to push for a revival of the treaty, Japan’s decision meant nothing other than a collapse of the naval-limitation system, and another heavy blow to international cooperation. Arguably his policies had failed from the start, since the German and Japanese moves might have been “pre-meditated and uninfluenced by Roosevelt’s actions.”​[161]​
These events encouraged Roosevelt to urge expansion of the American naval budget, but the powerful peace movement thwarted the President’s efforts. Even his decision for some relatively harmless strategic maneuvers of the American fleet in the Pacific led to thousands of protest letters to the White House.​[162]​ With the Japanese having occupied Manchuria already in 1931, however, the balance of power in the Pacific region was not exactly shifting in favour of the U.S, which held strategic interests at the Philippines and commercial interests in China.​[163]​ Across the Atlantic, the air quickly turned sour as well. Adolf Hitler in 1935 renounced the Versailles disarmament provisions altogether, making clear that Germany was on the eve of a “military renaissance.” In March 1936, German troops occupied the demilitarized Rhineland. Moreover, negotiations between Italy and Ethiopia collapsed in 1935, leading Italy to annex the country in 1936, and thereafter retreat from the League of Nations.​[164]​
Events throughout 1938 convinced at least the President that Hitler might eventually pose a serious threat to the U.S. At the September Munich Conference between Germany and the European Allies, Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland area, where a majority of the population spoke German, was handed over to Hitler, believing this move would satisfy his imperial appetite. Just as with Austria’s Anschluß to Germany in March of that same year, Hitler’s claim to the mountainous territory was explained away by the argument of self-determination for the German-speaking people, and therefore seen as more or less legitimate. It nevertheless deprived Czechoslovakia of its natural defense barrier. The British-French attempt to appease Hitler failed dismally, as German troops subsequently marched into the rest of Czechoslovakia six months later.
Roosevelt had not taken any action with regard to the Munich Conference other than urging the Allies, Hitler and Mussolini to come to a peaceful settlement. He did arguably draw important lessons from its aftermath. According to Barbara Rearden Farnham, “in the wake of the Munich crisis Roosevelt concluded that Hitler’s implacable aggressiveness, if left unchallenged, would eventually threaten American security, and he quickly settled on the policy of aiding Britain and France with planes, adhering to it tenaciously in the face of all opposition.”​[165]​ Although the mood of the American public was gradually shifting away from isolationism, the President had to be careful to keep his actions covert in order not to upset the nation or the Congress. As the U.S. was only slowly recovering from the economic disaster of 1929, he like no other grasped the tension between the domestic and international policy environments. As Farnham writes, to Roosevelt “aiding the democracies was a response to neither international nor domestic imperatives alone but to [his] perception of the growing conflict between them.”​[166]​ He convinced Congress to authorize increasing assistance to Britain, but stopped “short of outright belligerency.”​[167]​
The President’s 1940 State of the Union left the public somewhat puzzled. While making clear that he was not planning to fight a war, he made some clear remarks with regard to the European conflict, and the threats it posed, not least economically, to U.S. interests:

[Whether] we like it or not, the daily lives of American citizens will, of necessity, feel the shock of events on other continents. … I can understand the feelings of those who warn the nation that they will never again consent to the sending of American youth to fight on the soil of Europe. But, as I remember, nobody has asked them to consent – for nobody expects such an undertaking. I can also understand the wishfulness of those who oversimplify the whole situation by repeating that all we have to do is to mind our own business and keep the nation out of war. But there is a vast difference between keeping out of war and pretending that this war is none of our business.​[168]​

	The famous State of the Union of 1941, which became known as the “Four Freedoms” speech, was more outspoken, if not an actual statement of belligerence. Reciting that “at no previous time has American security been as seriously threatened from without as it is today,” Roosevelt made pledges for dramatic increases in defense spending, in order to make an “all-inclusive national defense” possible. Next to protecting its own homeland, moreover, the U.S. would grant loans worth billions of dollars to the Allies for rearmament. The reasons the President gave for this measure were clear, and included a strong appeal to the democratic peace theory:

... I find it, unhappily, necessary to report that the future and the safety of our country and of our democracy are overwhelmingly involved in events far beyond our borders. ... No realistic American can expect from a dictator’s peace international generosity, or return of true independence, or world disarmament, or freedom of expression, or freedom of religion – or even good business. ... As long as the aggressor nations maintain the offensive, they – not we – will choose the time and the place and the method of their attack. That is why the future of all the American Republics is today in serious danger. ... Let us say to the democracies: “We Americans are vitally concerned in your defense of freedom. We are putting forth our energies, our resources and our organizing powers to give you the strength to regain and maintain a free world. ...” Such aid is not an act of war, even if a dictator should unilaterally proclaim it so to be.​[169]​
	
“All great leaders walk alone,” Henry Kissinger contends in his account of Roosevelt. “Their singularity springs from their ability to discern challenges that are not yet apparent to their contemporaries. Roosevelt took an isolationist people into a war between countries whose conflicts had only a few years earlier been widely considered inconsistent with American values and irrelevant to American security.”​[170]​ Roosevelt was an educator indeed. Most importantly, like arguably only Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson before him, he desired to reconcile his nation’s power and interests with the universal appeal of its values. Again in Kissinger’s words, “destiny imposed on him the obligation of defending democracy around the world.”​[171]​ Even the great realist, thus, shows respect for the unmistakable moralism of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, because both recognized the threat Germany posed to their nation, and Roosevelt was able to convince the Americans of the necessity of intervening in World War II.
The second road to world peace
If the American people still had any hesitations after “Munich” (and they had many), these were taken away by the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor of December 7, 1941. “The facts of yesterday and today speak for themselves,” the President declared the day after the horrible event. 

The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our nation. As commander in chief of the Army and Navy, I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense. ... No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory. ... With confidence in our armed forces, with the unbounding determination of our people, we will gain the inevitable triumph – so help us God. I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7th, 1941, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese empire.​[172]​


Hitler, who had been well aware of the political divisions in the U.S. and had skillfully avoided offsetting American military intervention, changed his mind directly after the attacks. Realizing that he could not walk out on his Japanese allies at this all-decisive moment, he declared war on the United States.​[173]​ So it happened that only 23 years after the “war to end all wars” the U.S. found itself involved in a war even more magnifying than the one of 1914-18. Rather quickly, American forces were engaged in combat in the Pacific and Africa, and defending the Atlantic against German naval warfare. The climax of combat came with the Allied invasion of Normandy on D-Day, and the subsequent liberation of Europe. The American intervention in the war became an existential struggle to deprive liberalism of its enemies, which Roosevelt had already envisioned in his “Four Freedoms” speech of 1941. Securing these freedoms came with a huge cost: hundreds of thousands of Americans had lost their lives when World War II finally ended with the unconditional surrender of Japan in August 1945.
The end of the war cleared the way for an American-dominated peace. Like Wilson had done merely a generation earlier, Roosevelt laid out his vision already in his wartime speeches. The United States, Roosevelt stated as early as May 1941, “will not accept a world, like the postwar world of the 1920s, in which the seeds of Hitlerism can again be planted and allowed to grow.”​[174]​ Despite the obvious complicity of the failed League of Nations to the rise of “Hitlerism,” his statement did not imply a rejection of pluralism as such. For Roosevelt still saw the world entirely in Wilsonian terms. An admirer of his predecessor, the President shared with him a desire to eliminate old balance-of-power politics and opt for some form of collective security. What he had in mind, however, differed sharply from the League of Nations concept.
The signing of the Atlantic Charter, a joint declaration with the British, gave away some of his intentions. America’s commitment to this document is somewhat remarkable, since it was signed and published in August 1941, when the United States was still technically neutral. In the tiny document, Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill assured that their nations were not seeking territorial expansion, but rather rejected “territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.” They called for free access to raw materials for all nations, more economic cooperation, freedom of the seas, “freedom from fear and want,” and lower trade barriers.​[175]​ For our purposes, the eighth and final statement is the most interesting:

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.​[176]​

It was to be the first step toward the establishment of the United Nations. The actual term “United Nations” was introduced in a declaration signed by twenty-six Allied states on January 1, 1942, in which they stated to subscribe to the Atlantic Charter, as well as to commit “full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war,” and “to cooperate with the Gov​ernments signatory hereto.”​[177]​ The fact that the new international institution bore the name of the Allied powers, confirmed that the post-1945 peace, just as its post-1918 counterpart, was above all a peace of victors.
Yet the Allied plans turned out to be substantially different from those forged at Versailles. As Gordon Craig and Alexander George point out, Roosevelt felt that the Allies had made some big mistakes in 1918. First, they had signed an armistice with the new democratic German government, not the Kaiser, but had failed to defeat its forces completely, which led German nationalists to claim afterwards that the new government had “stabbed the army in the back.” Second, he insisted on developing economic policies and international cooperation, since the total defeat of the Axis Powers would mean little if economic hardship would bring totalitarian regimes to power again. Finally, Roosevelt realized that the interbellum peace had failed not only because the U.S. had not entered the League of Nations, but also because it had retreated into isolationism again.​[178]​
Just before American armed forces set foot on French soil in June 1944, Roosevelt urged Winston Churchill not to ask him “to keep any American forces in France. I just cannot do it! ... You really ought to bring up and discipline your own children.”​[179]​ Nevertheless, the insights he derived from the dramatic turn of events in the interbellum led him to envision a post-war state system that had the ability to enforce security, and the U.S. would play a big role in it. As he had laid out in the Atlantic Charter, he wanted to have the agressors of World War II disarmed, while the victorious “peace-loving nations” would secure the peace. Roosevelt developed a “Great Design,” in which “Four Policemen,” the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Britain, would take this burden upon themselves, and enjoy a monopoly of military power.​[180]​ It would have meant nothing other than outright hegemony based on liberal principles, and a denial of sovereignty to those states that would not fall in the “Policemen” category.
Hostile reactions by the American public led Roosevelt to weaken his opposition to a form of collective security based on international law. Anxious of still more extraordinary American military commitments abroad, many pressure groups insisted that he adhere to the Moscow Declaration of October 1943, in which the four designated “Policemen” agreed “that they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.”​[181]​ As it was, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin did not believe China was capable of burdening itself with a global military role anyway, and suggested that the world be divided in spheres of influence, a notion Roosevelt despised. The “Four Policemen” scheme, Kissinger writes, could never have worked without a moral consensus, which was obviously lacking on the 1945 international scene.​[182]​ Therefore, the President gradually transformed it into the idea of a Security Council at the top of the United Nations. The idea that the U.S. and the Soviet Union should preserve friendly and cooperative relations was most important to Roosevelt anyway.​[183]​
For all their talk of sovereign equality of states and self-determination for all peoples, Roosevelt and Stalin were making territorial arrangements for Central and Eastern Europe, which the Red army had occupied, and which Stalin regarded as a security barrier against another potential revival of German aggression. Roosevelt was unwilling to use force in order to make the Soviets retreat, but did fear that the American public would see the Russian behavior as conflicting with the principles laid out in the Moscow Declaration, and therefore regard the Soviet Union as expansionist and untrustworthy. He insisted that Stalin exercise self-restraint, and tried to persuade him that disarming and controlling Germany, rather than tough control over Eastern Europe, would provide the best security guarantee for the Soviet Union. At the Tehran and Yalta conferences, Roosevelt pushed hard to make Stalin cooperate, in the words of Craig and George, “at least to the extent of providing a “cosmetic” façade to the creation of pro-Soviet regimes” by organizing “free” elections.​[184]​ Finally, Stalin did seem to give up on some of his imperial ambitions.
The Yalta summit of February 1945 cleared the way for the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Fransisco, which was to start in April. After Roosevelt’s return, he declared to the Congress that the Yalta Conference 

... ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries – and have always failed. We propose to substitute for all these a universal organization in which all peace-loving nations will finally have a chance to join.​[185]​

The address was greeted with great public enthusiasm, as many Americans felt that the new organization would reduce American responsibilities abroad. However, they held “unreasonable expectations” as to the U.N.’s ability to provide worldwide security.​[186]​
	President Roosevelt died only days before the San Fransisco Conference took off. His successor, Vice-President Harry Truman, led the convening states to agree upon the United Nations Charter. The states adhering to the Charter committed themselves to resolve international disputes peacefully, would “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,” and would respect state sovereignty. Force out of self-defense was permitted, but since states would refrain from military aggression in the first place, self-defense was necessary in theory only. The Security Council could adopt diplomatic and military measures in the case of a threat to “international peace and security.” The Council, which consisted of five permanent members with a veto (the original “Four Policemen” and France) and ten rotating seats without a veto, was expected to acquire command of its own military force, provided by the U.N. member states.​[187]​
	The Charter’s provisions were a second attempted revolution in international affairs. Roosevelt, who during almost his entire presidency had conducted a foreign policy mixing democratic messianism, pluralism, and old-school realism, had left his nation a legacy of Wilsonian pluralism. Ironically, whereas American public opinion had doomed the fate of the League because of a rejection of international commitments, for the same reason it had persuaded Roosevelt to establish the United Nations. The latter, however, was by far not as enthused about Wilson’s principled pluralism as he was about a liberal hegemony of the “Four Policemen.” Yet the essential premise of the two concepts was the same. “No realistic American can expect from a dictator’s peace international generosity, or return of true independence, or world disarmament, or freedom of expression, or freedom of religion – or even good business,” Roosevelt had stated in 1941.​[188]​ Therefore, it was up to the “peace-loving nations” to address the threats posed by hostile dictators. This revealed the President’s belief in the democratic peace theory. The fact that the Soviet Union, far from being a liberal democracy, was also included in the side of the “peace-loving nations” can easily be explained by its immense efforts to bring the Germans to their knees. The geopolitical reality of the day resulted in Soviet participation in what the Americans perceived to be a battle for an enlightened purpose: the global defense of democracy.
Just like his predecessor and inspirator Wilson, thus, Roosevelt seemed convinced of the Kantian notion that states could be persuaded to display self-constraint in their foreign relations, even though some key U.N. member states were far from being representative or democratic republics. Arguably, the newly established organization would have required the same moral consensus as the “Four Policemen” scheme. Being the international equivalent of liberal democracy, its members should also have been liberal and democratic for it to be effective. That might have been the fulfillment of the perpetual peace. The expectations toward the United Nations were too high indeed. As for Kant, the great philosopher himself would have had the same reservations toward the U.N. as he would have had toward the League of Nations. Roosevelt wanted a few nations to guarantee, if not enforce, international peace and security, whereas Kant thought liberal republics would naturally be more peaceful. The U.N.’s authority he would have feared to end up becoming a tyranny itself. Yet the similarities between Kant’s perpetual peace and Roosevelt’s final creation are unmistakable. Roosevelt, thus, followed the Wilsonian tradition in American foreign policy.
	The final year of World War II marked the beginning of a distinctly pluralist moment in the American public opinion. Directly after Roosevelt died, Stalin declared that he would send his foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov to the San Fransisco Conference, next to the representative that was coming initially. This gesture gave Americans the idea that the Soviet leader was serious in his commitment to collective security. Moreover, as the British high U.N. official Brian Urquhart after his resignation contended with disapproval, his former employer was perceived to be a peace organization “with teeth,” as opposed to the League of Nations.​[189]​ On July 28, 1945, the U.S. Senate, which had radically turned its back on the League, ratified the U.N. Charter with an impressive number of 89 votes in favor and only two against.
Yet the pluralist moment would not turn into a pluralist era in American foreign policy. History would prove that the optimism with regard to the U.N. and the Soviet Union’s commitment to it was but wishful thinking of an American public, that was, above all, anxious to prevent more American blood from being spilled for the sake of humanity. As relations between the former Allies quickly turned sour after 1945, great leadership was again required to convince the nation of the necessity of American military hegemony.

Truman, Kennan, and containment
When President Harry Truman took office on April 12, 1945, it was already clear that Stalin was violating the Yalta agreements by bringing Central and Eastern Europe under firm Soviet control anyway. Truman decided to be tough on the Russians from the start. He called in Molotov, who was in San Fransisco at the time, for an explanation for the situation in Poland. “I gave him the one-two, right to the jaw,” the President later declared in his memoirs.​[190]​ Soon after, he canceled all lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union, which had been started during the war in the face of the Nazi threat. Stalin’s alleged response to this measure was that he found it “brutal.”​[191]​ Truman held little sympathy for subtle diplomacy, leaving the already deeply paranoid Soviet leader to conclude that the American policy toward his emerging superpower was reversing starkly. If anything, Truman’s tough stance only led Stalin to tighten his control on Central Europe.​[192]​
	Since Truman could but hesitantly accept the emerging military divide of Europe, and still needed the Soviets to bring Japan to its knees in the Pacific, he backed down a little. Nevertheless, the events in 1945 became symbolic for the quickly widening gap between the two superpowers. As Truman left for the Potsdam conference in July of that same year, the first nuclear test had just been conducted in New Mexico with great success, leaving the emboldened President to boss the entire meeting. He mentioned his new bomb without going into detail about it, and Stalin, who had already heard about it through intelligence, apparently showed little interest.​[193]​
Yet the American nuclear monopoly gave the U.S. enormous power in its dealings with the Soviets. Some “revisionist” Cold War historians have claimed that the nuclear devastation brought upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of that same year was in fact a manifestation of “atomic diplomacy” toward Stalin.​[194]​ (The only alternative way to force the Japanese to surrender, however, would arguably have been a bloody land invasion, since horrendous conventional bombings had already failed to bring them to their knees.​[195]​) It nevertheless did not soften Russian behavior. In fact, Stalin clamped down even harder on Romania and Bulgaria, he occupied a slice of Poland and in return gave the Poles a chunk of Eastern Germany, and was on his way to make a satellite of northern Korea.
The administration proved unable yet to formulate a coherent policy toward the perceived Soviet expansionism. Despite the fact that a growing consensus emerged among high officials that the Soviet Union sought “domination of a communist world,” Truman was indecisive. Many officials, and also the President himself, complained about the badly functioning Secretary of State James Byrnes, but Byrnes stayed on throughout 1946. As Stalin delivered a famous speech on February 9 of that year, in which he blamed capitalism for the outbreak of World War II and stated that only communism could prevent the world against future wars, the U.S. was still seeking a proper response to the new threat.​[196]​
	Much changed with the famous Long Telegram, which a high diplomat at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, George F. Kennan, sent to Washington in early 1947. In the Soviet Union, Kennan wrote, “extremism was the normal form of rule and foreigners were expected to be mortal enemies.” It was, moreover, actively seeking to break American power.​[197]​ The Long Telegram did not fall on deaf ears, and administration officials were vigorously circulating it among politicians. In a lengthy article in Foreign Affairs of July 1947 under the pseudonym “X,” Kennan subsequently laid out his visions for containment of the communist threat, which became a benchmark for U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War.
	The “X-article” recited what Kennan had already stated in his telegram about the nature of the Soviet regime, which could not be trusted to commit itself to international agreements and was characterized by “secretiveness,” a “lack of frankness,” “duplicity,” a “wary suspiciousness” and its “basic unfriendliness of purpose.” “These characteristics of Soviet policy,” Kennan wrote, “... are basic to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us, whether in the foreground or the background, until the internal nature of Soviet  power is changed.”​[198]​ Yet, although communism was unmistakably irreconcilable with capitalism and would forever aim to destroy it,

... the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient. ... In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward “toughness.” ... [It] is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.​[199]​

The mix of realism and liberalism Kennan displayed is remarkable. He presumed that the Soviet regime’s evil nature led it to an aggressive foreign policy, although it patiently awaited its opportunities for expansion. This implied a belief in the democratic peace. Nevertheless, the U.S. should not answer the Soviet threat with all-out aggression. Prudence and caution were the keywords. (It is interesting to note that Kennan left office in 1950 feeling his containment theory was hijacked by other officials who in his eyes laid too much emphasis on its military aspects. The war in Korea was a case in point, and he describes it in detail in his memoirs.​[200]​) With pragmatism and limited power, the U.S. could be rather successful, for “Russia ... is still by far the weaker party ... This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world.”​[201]​
Kennan’s plea for containment was a declaration of the universal application of the Truman Doctrine, announced a couple of months before. In a March 1947 speech to the Congress, the President stated that communist insurgencies in Greece and Turkey needed to be countered with American military and economic aid: 
Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. The United States must supply that assistance. ... As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help. ... One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. ... We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.​[202]​

Truman’s speech and Kennan’s essay marked the take-off of containment as an official policy instrument with regard to the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine was an essentially realist approach to the new political reality in Europe, but just like Kennan, the President was convinced of the link between the Soviet regime’s nature and its foreign policy, and that this link had a negative impact on international security. This also implied a belief in the positive effect democracy had on the world. His belief in this merit of democracy apparently led him to back up his initiative with regard to Greece and Turkey with a rather pluralist argument: “The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred,” Truman said. “But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations (​http:​/​​/​www.yale.edu​/​lawweb​/​avalon​/​un​/​unchart.htm​) by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”​[203]​
These words were mere rhetoric rather than an honest expression of allegiance to the United Nations, however. As Craig and George point out, Truman and especially his Secretary of State Dean Acheson had much contempt for the functioning of the U.N. When Israel was officially founded on May 15, 1948, the administration immediately recognized the independent Jewish state without even informing its own U.N. delegation. The U.N.’s restrictions with regard to the American efforts in the Korean War were also deeply unpopular in the administration, and led Acheson to write in retrospect: “I wished then, as often before and since, that the headquarters of the United Nations were anywhere except in our own country.”​[204]​ (Many more American leaders would come to express such views in the history of the U.N.) The administration’s lack of faith was understandable if not justified, since if the United Nations would in fact function as it should, how could the Soviet Union conduct such gross violations of state sovereignty in Central and Eastern Europe? And why would the Soviet Union have to make a strategic buffer against a potential German military revival in the first place? If the Russians were conducting brutal Realpolitik, Truman argued, the U.S. should follow.
This was exactly what the administration was doing, and Greece, which seemed closest to falling to communism, provided a “test case” for its containment theory. Although the Truman Doctrine “most certainly contributed in keeping Greece out of the Iron Curtain,” John Iatrides argues that it is unlikely that the Soviets were really providing the communist insurgency in Greece with support.​[205]​ Kissinger seems to disagree with that conclusion, as he writes that it was “supported from bases in communist Yugoslavia and the Bulgarian Soviet satellite.”​[206]​




Harry Truman has often been accused of having come to Washington severely handicapped. As Arnold Offner writes, 

Truman’s parochialism and nationalism, and significant insecurity, were rooted in his background, despite his claim to have had a bucolic childhood of happy family, farm life, and Baptist religiosity. In fact, young Harry’s poor eyesight, extended illness, and “sissy” piano playing alienated him from both his peers and his feisty father and fostered ambivalence in him toward powerful men.​[207]​

Even writers with a more sympathetic view of the former President acknowledge that Truman had his shortcomings. Kissinger contends that he had no real foreign policy experience when he took office. A man born of Midwestern rural middle class, he had never gone beyond secondary school level.​[208]​
	For all his inexperience, however, Truman was easibly able to grasp the political realities of the day. As the power equilibrium of the Cold War was crystallizing, Truman saw the strategic and economic importance of keeping Europe within the American sphere of influence, a realization which manifested itself in his Truman Doctrine, and also in the Marshall Plan. Nicknamed after Secretary of State George Marshall, this generous financial aid scheme for Europe was actually called the European Recovery Program (ERP), and was developed in the wake of “the British withdrawal from Greece, the solidification of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, the erosion of British and French power in Western Europe, and the resurgence of communist parties in France, Italy and Germany.”​[209]​ Not only would economic aid boost demand for American exports and support for American plans for a multilateral world trade system, it would also preclude Soviet expansion. Especially Dean Acheson saw the program mostly in strategic terms.​[210]​
	Creating and presenting the Marshall Plan revealed anxiety by the former Allies to agree on having the German economy recover again. France and the Soviet Union refused to put their security at stake by allowing the Germans to rebuild their industries. Stalin might have believed, moreover, that a stalemate with the Americans and the consequent continuing economic crisis would strengthen the local communists in Western Europe and therefore serve Soviet interests. For the Americans, however, it was clear that Germany held the key to a successful economy in the whole of Europe, as it had done before the war. Therefore, the U.S. insisted that it be allowed to fully develop.​[211]​ As it was, Stalin’s tough stance but isolated the Soviet Union and further deepened East-West tensions. Yet his fright of the “German problem” was shared by many European leaders as well. Their fear was not unjustified, since German power had demolished their societies twice within thirty years.
It was up to the United States to reassure the Europeans by addressing the threats of both the Soviet Union and potential German grievances. These military issues found a military solution: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, was to be a self-binding Western safeguard against communism for the next forty years. The choice for a military alliance essentially stemmed from a realization by the administration, through World War II experience, that power and the willingness to use power are the best guarantee for security. Although Roosevelt in 1944 had assured Winston Churchill that the U.S. would pull out its forces after the war would come to an end, Britain was by no means capable of “looking after its own children.”
In fact, the devastation of Germany at the end of the war left an immense power vacuum in the heart of Europe. As Stalin was tightening his control over Central and Eastern Europe, and communist parties enjoyed great popularity in most of empoverished Western Europe, the consequences of an American withdrawal were obvious. The announcement of the Marshall Plan, moreover, led the already paranoid Stalin to engage in a purge of communist leaders in all of his sphere of influence. All leaders whom he suspected of having some nationalist sentiments were either killed or ousted. Even the elected communist government of Chzechoslovakia was overthrown, and its foreign minister most probably thrown out of his office window by communist thugs.​[212]​
That event was an immediate cause for establishing NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on April 4, 1949 by the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, and Italy. These states put their militaries under a joint command structure, “determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. ... They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.” The member states committed themselves to solve international disputes peacefully, in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Even the key fifth article held a reference to the U.N: 

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.​[213]​

While carefully having avoided to identify the enemy, the NATO members had reached an unprecedented, historical agreement by pooling not only their defenses, but also their interests. The administration perceived Europe’s interests to be identical to those of the U.S. If Europe would fall to communism, it argued, it would be a catastrophe for Americans as well, both strategically and economically. This quintessentially realist argument was sold on rather enlightened terms at home, however. In his 1949 State of the Union, President Truman already made clear that

We are following a foreign policy which is the outward expression of the democratic faith we profess. We are doing what we can to encourage free states and free peoples throughout the world, to aid the suffering and afflicted in foreign lands, and to strengthen democratic nations against aggression. The heart of our foreign policy is peace. ... The strength of our Nation must continue to be used in the interest of all our people rather than a privileged few. It must continue to be used unselfishly in the struggle for world peace and the betterment of mankind the world over.​[214]​

One year later and six months after the Senate had ratified the North Atlantic Treaty, Truman referred to NATO in similar ways:

Under the principles of the United Nations Charter we must continue to share in the common defense of free nations against aggression. ... Our aim for a peaceful, democratic world of free peoples will be achieved in the long run, not by force of arms, but by an appeal to the minds and hearts of men. ... This challenge to us is more than a military challenge. It is a challenge to the honesty of our profession of the democratic faith; it is a challenge to the efficiency and stability of our economic system; it is a challenge to the willingness to work with other peoples for world peace and for world prosperity. ... I believe that our country, at this crucial point in world history, will meet that challenge successfully.​[215]​

Secretary of State Dean Acheson reinforced these views when he said that the U.S, in helping Europe, “has advanced international cooperation to maintain the peace, to advance human rights, to raise standards of living, and to promote respect for the principal of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”​[216]​
Although realists saw it as a means to preserve the Cold War balance of power, NATO was called anything but a traditional alliance, and the people were buying it. As one Democratic Senator confirmed at the time, it was “an alliance against war itself.”​[217]​ This conclusion is not insignificant, since it helped define the American public’s perception of NATO’s purposes, and reinforced its quintessentially Wilsonian attitude toward foreign policy issues. As Hugh Gusterson notes, “the graceful execution of US foreign-relations somersault from isolationist giant to emergent global hegemon was also facilitated by the rhetorical strengths of the texts through which this maneuver was declared.”​[218]​ The U.S. had indeed become a hegemon, but, at least to its own people, the hegemon was liberal. Had the administration chosen to justify its new commitments to Europe in alternative ways, the Americans would not have been so enthused.
	The Truman administration finally succeeded in what many administrations before it could not succeed in: pulling the United States out of isolationism once and for all. Linking American interests and ideals to those of Europe implied an unprecedented and perhaps permanent military commitment to the Old World. This commitment was reinforced by the precarious German situation. Still ruled by a joint sovereignty of the U.S, Britain, France and the Soviet Union, Germany was not allowed to rebuild its defenses. Neither side of the Cold War was willing to give up its part of the country, for they feared it would align with the other side, or stay neutral and revive its imperialistic ambitions once again. This dilemma imposed on Truman the burden of keeping hundreds of thousands of troops in Germany, de facto permanently occupying a large chunk of it.
	A realist though he was, the Truman administration carried with it a strong belief that democracy and freedom had a universal appeal and possessed a pacifying force, both of which were being thwarted by a Soviet evil, and that the U.S. should wield its ever-growing power to defend and spread them. Especially George Kennan was eager to draw the link between the Soviet regime and its foreign policy, so emphasizing an allegiance to the writings of Immanuel Kant. Although the administration showed to have a great self-confidence, however, its officials were no utopians who believed that a liberal pacific zone was naturally expanding over the world. Above all, they believed that only power would be able to preserve and expand the liberal democratic bloc, and the peace within its borders.
The Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm has accused Truman of having set the “apocalyptic tone of the Cold War,”​[219]​ and some “revisionists” go as far as to say that the President actually caused East-West relations to turn sour.​[220]​ These accounts do not do sufficient justice to the events in Eastern and Central Europe in the wake of the war, however. Hobsbawm is unmistakably right in his analysis that the administration exaggerated the direct threat that the still non-nuclear Soviet Union posed to the U.S. at the time. Yet Stalin did not prove himself to be much of a reliable partner. Truman at most tipped the balance toward complete distrust between the two superpowers, but surely it was Stalin who set the tone. The President held a rather realistic perception of the potential danger of a totally communist Europe and the consequences it would have for his nation.







The first rise of neoconservatism: Ronald Reagan 

“Containing the Soviet Union, together with the ideology it created, has been the most durable foreign policy priority of the United States in the twentieth Century. Each presidential administration since Woodrow Wilson’s has devoted itself in one way or another to this task, and during the Cold War containment became a national fixation.”​[221]​ These are the words of the famous Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis, whose conclusion that Wilson to some extent practiced containment is remarkable, since it would only become an official policy toward the Soviet Union after Harry Truman’s rise to power. Yet it should not be surprising that the greatest prophet of the democratic peace thought that the Soviet regime was nothing other than evil and untrustworthy. Indeed, as his last Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby wrote, “The existing regime in Russia is based upon the negation of every principle of honor and good faith, and every usage and convention, underlying the whole structure of international law.”​[222]​
	For Wilson, of course, the Soviet Union was not the key strategic challenge it became later, as tsarist Russia had been a relatively insignificant, underdeveloped country, and so was its successor in Wilson’s time. When it emerged as a great power after World War II, however, it became clear that it had few common interests with the U.S. and many competing ones. Dealing with a regime that was above all deeply illiberal and undemocratic, most American administrations followed a similar policy to counter communism and enforce liberal democracy, however prudently. For that was essentially the purpose of containment. Despite all their realistic accounts of the Soviet power and the seeming impossibility to overthrow it, most Presidents dealed with the Russians on the premise that their regime was illegitimate, aggressive, and not to be trusted, and that the state of affairs in the world was temporary, not lasting.
	The notable exceptions to this perception were the Nixon and Ford administrations, in which Henry Kissinger played a dominant role, first as National Security Advisor, and then as Secretary of State. Kissinger was arguably the first government official to publicly state that the Soviet Union was a state like all others, and therefore pursued rational interests. Like any state, the Soviet regime would never voluntarily give up its power, Kissinger assumed, and therefore Americans should get used to the idea that the Cold War state of affairs was a permanent one. The United States, in short, should learn to accommodate itself to the Soviet power. For Kissinger, foreign policy should be detached from domestic and personal morality. On the international scene, the U.S, just like the enemy, should pursue the logic of raison d’état on an amoral basis. Rather than trying to erase evil regimes from the world map, he attempted to form a balance of power with the Russians that would in the end preserve peace and security. “The true task of statesmanship,” Kissinger argued in 1975, “is to draw from the balance of power a more positive capacity to better the human condition.”​[223]​
	As Gaddis argues, however, this realist position was overwhelmed by the idea of “human rights as the primary American interest.”​[224]​ Nixon and Ford received criticism from liberals for doing business with China, Iran and the military regime in Chile, and from conservatives, who pointed at Soviet human rights violations to undermine support for detente.​[225]​ “Since the Nixon-Kissinger era,” David Forsythe writes, “every US President has rhetorically endorsed human rights as part of his foreign policy agenda.”​[226]​ As it was, the United States faced increased criticism toward its foreign policy anyway, not least domestically. The dramatic Vietnam War had dealt a heavy blow to America’s legitimacy abroad, and American liberals were, since the 1960s, up in arms against the conventional foreign policy wisdoms that had guided earlier generations of politicians. The public no longer took the American exceptionalism for granted.
As a result, a Democratic President came to power in 1977 for whom human rights were a key priority. Jimmy Carter had received warm public support for his campaign slogan that the U.S. deserved “a government as good as the American people.”​[227]​ Although his pursuit of human rights in American foreign policy has often been exaggerated by his domestic opponents, he certainly conducted some policies that were in sharp contrast with those of Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger. He exerted diplomatic pressure on various authoritarian regimes, and dissociated the U.S. from some of them. Furthermore, he helped bring about a U.N. arms embargo against the South African Apartheid regime, a Cold War ally of the United States. His complaints about human rights violations in the Soviet Union, moreover, undermined the relaxation in East-West relations and the arms control talks that followed from it. The Carter administration, in Forsythe’s words, “did satisfy certain domestic demands linked to American exceptionalism,” an idea which had become increasingly under attack throughout the previous decade.​[228]​
Jimmy Carter, one might argue, would have made an excellent subject for this thesis. His principled liberalism and his attempts to reinvigorate the American exceptionalism indeed deserve some attention. Next to the obvious limitations in space, however, there is another reason why he is not included in a separate chapter in this thesis. Every other President currently under our scrutiny has conducted his foreign policy starting from the premise of American self-righteousness. Regardless of Forsythe’s remark, the American exceptionalism is based on the notion that American interests go hand in hand with the universal appeal of its ideals. Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Harry Truman all adopted that view, and consequently built their foreign policy around it. In the case of Carter, however, his principled adherence to human rights allegedly damaged American interests. For one, when the administration dissociated itself from the pro-American authoritarian regimes of Iran and Nicaragua, they quickly gave way to dictatorships very hostile to the U.S, and the President received the blame for it.​[229]​

The roots of neoconservatism
The perceived inability of politicians and intellectuals to reinvigorate the American exceptionalism itself provoked a counterforce in the public arena. For another group of devout liberals, labeled “neoconservatives,” began to develop a revolutionary view toward liberalism as a current in American politics. Neoconservatism emerged in the late 1930s, when a group of young, mostly Jewish students of the City College of New York (CCNY) exchanged their political ideas in the college cafeteria. The fascist threat in Europe placed American liberals, progressives, and communists on the same side, and many of these students were Trotskyites or Stalinists at the time.​[230]​ This sympathy quickly disappeared when the Cold War started, however, and soon American liberals had forged a staunch anti-communist consensus, which the liberal historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. at the time called the “vital center.”​[231]​ The vital center maintained a deep distrust of both left- and rightwing totalitarianism, and thought communism to be the greatest post-war threat to liberalism. It warmly welcomed George Kennan’s “X-article,” which led Schlesinger to write that containment was America’s new “world destiny.”​[232]​ His book appearing at roughly the same time as George Orwell’s 1984, Schlesinger received much sympathy for his views.​[233]​
	From the 1950s on, alternative accounts on the origins of the Cold War started to emerge. Led by William Appleman Williams, “revisionist” historians “rejected the orthodox explanations of the origins of the cold war that emphasized Soviet culpability,” and instead “placed much of the blame on the United States.”​[234]​ Their arguments gained momentum as the war in Vietnam escalated in the 1960s and social upheaval spread through the country. President Lyndon B. Johnson came under serious attack from members of his own Democratic Party. The liberal foreign policy consensus was broken, and liberals were also deeply divided on how to deal with the domestic protests, riots, and black militancy that came with the Vietnam crisis.​[235]​
As liberalism fractured, a new group emerged from its ruins. Led by the former City College students Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Nathan Glazer, this group turned its back on what it perceived to be radical domestic reforms and wishful thinking on foreign policy issues conducted by its former peers. Accused of turning to the right, these men were labeled “new conservative” by their fellow Democrats, which later evolved into “neoconservative.” To those concerned, neoconservatism and liberalism, in Moynihan’s words, meant “roughly the same thing: that a concern for the country’s less favored citizens is tempered by the realization that, at least for now, capitalism seems to be a more efficient creator of wealth for all than socialism.”​[236]​ In a 1965 study called The Negro Family, Moynihan contended that social incentives would not be able to solve poverty-related crime by African-Americans, since it had complex origins in culture and family structure. Most neoconservatives criticized social engineering and affirmative action, and argued that addressing the symptoms rather than the root causes of crime would be much more effective. By acting against petty crimes as well as major ones, police departments could make an enormous contribution to resolving socio-economic problems, they thought.​[237]​
In magazines like Commentary and The National Interest, the neoconservatives warned against Soviet expansionism. Their liberal convictions they derived largely from the writings of the political philosopher Leo Strauss. Strauss, a German Jewish immigrant who lectured at the University of Chicago until he died in 1973, hardly professed any ideology, but did have a strong preference for liberal democracy over totalitarianism. His interpreters not rarely saw the United States, in Fukuyama’s words, as “the apotheosis of the political tradition stemming from Plato and Aristotle, thus merging Strauss’s philosophical concerns with American nationalism.”​[238]​
Neither Strauss nor his great Greek examples believed that democracy was a natural and rational choice of regime for a people. He did believe, however, that the nature of a regime is decisive in the way it shapes its citizens’ cultural norms and habits. Straussians and neoconservatives alike were never libertarians. They did not radically oppose state intervention, but they thought welfare to have a negative impact on the character of the poor. In general, however, a democratic regime would certainly shape its citizens in a better way than its non-democratic counterpart would.​[239]​ Although Strauss never wrote about foreign policy, his distinguished ideas on regimes had major implications for liberalism in general. For if the nature of a regime influenced the character of its subjects, it would also affect its external behavior. Its foreign policy would reflect the values of its underlying society, since regimes that treat their own citizens unjustly likely treat foreigners the same way. Consequently, it could be argued that changing the nature of a state will prove more effective than trying to change its behavior.​[240]​ This is, indeed, nothing other than a version of the democratic peace theory, which is exactly how many of Strauss’s followers have interpreted his writings.
Another influential thinker at the roots of neoconservatism was Albert Wohlstetter, who did write extensively on foreign policy. Among his students were later neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, both of whom held high positions in the first Bush administration. A policy analyst at the Rand Corporation in the 1950s and 1960s, Wohlstetter’s main preoccupations were nuclear deterrence and proliferation. He did not believe in the notion of “mutual assured destruction” (MAD). While he thought the mere threat of killing millions alone immoral, he argued that with increasing ICBM accuracies a “counterforce war” was thinkable in the not too distant future. In this scenario, the Soviet Union would launch a first strike on American nuclear bases, wiping out all land-based nuclear forces of the U.S, and keeping enough weapons to be able to deter an American submarine counterstrike on Russian cities. Moreover, he criticized the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), as he thought that nuclear technologies for civilian and military use could never be reliably separated. The NPT would, in Wohlstetter’s eyes, not be able to keep states from obtaining nuclear arms. Although smaller states with nuclear weapons might also adhere to the rules of mutual deterrence, moreover, especially nascent nuclear states without a secure second-strike capability he thought would be more prone to preemptive strikes by their opponents.​[241]​
	The godfathers of neoconservatism, thus, rallied against two realist foreign policy wisdoms. First, they dismissed the premise that each state, regardless of its regime, follows a same rationale of power and interests. Second, they rejected the strategic arms control talks with the Soviets, and the American commitment to a general nonproliferation regime on a pluralist basis. These foreign policy views, together with their rather revolutionary views on domestic issues, left the neoconservatives to be an increasingly isolated and powerless faction within their party. This was reinforced, Ehrman writes, by the fact that they saw “support for liberalism at home and abroad as inseparable...” They “would see leftist attacks on American foreign policy as part of the assault on democracy at home,” and “saw the consequences of a leftist triumph in apocalyptic terms – the end of democracy in the United States and a Communist triumph abroad.”​[242]​
	What was once the vital center was now the stage of an immense ideological conflict within the liberal left. In fact, the neoconservatives could, by most measures, hardly still be labeled leftwing. Throughout the 1970s, many, though not all, of them switched to the Republican Party, where they campaigned for Ronald Reagan when he became the Republican candidate for the 1980 presidential elections. This step would lead to their first rise to power. 

Neoconservatism and Reaganism
Ronald Reagan was a most remarkable man, who will be remembered for his staunch anti-communism and his good sense of humor. Having studied economics and sociology in college, he won himself a Hollywood movie contract in 1937, and subsequently appeared in more than fifty movies in the next two decades. Through his job as president of the Screen Actors Guild, Reagan became preoccupied with the issue of leftwing sympathies in the film industry. It led him to make a switch to the Republican Party. In 1966, he was elected Governor of California. It marked the beginning of a distinguished political career.​[243]​
Reagan was elected President after a campaign in which he rejected the SALT II treaty, called for a rapid increase in defense spending to regain military superiority over the Soviet Union, and also plead for a return to a militant containment.​[244]​ Moreover, he criticized Carter for putting American security at risk by dissociating the U.S. from friendly, undemocratic regimes. Reagan, just like the neoconservatives, reacted to the counter-culture of the 1960s and 1970s, and above all wanted to regain America’s self-confidence. Vietnam was still fresh in people’s memory, and had not passed unnoticed in the rest of the world. As former U.S. ambassador and author Michael Novak allegedly wrote to Jeane Kirkpatrick: “As matters stand, we are just a few years short from being a pariah nation. Rhetorically, we already are.”​[245]​ While socialist states were winning the moral battle and were backed even by some American allies, it was thought, Americans but stood by and allowed it to happen. The United Nations Commission of Human Rights, where the U.S. and Israel were often being vigorously criticized by notorious human rights violators, was a case in point.​[246]​
The perceived solution to this demise of the American exceptionalism was a return to the times of Harry Truman or even Theodore Roosevelt, both of whom had pursued an enlightened form of self-interest. American power, in their eyes, not only served the U.S, but also the rest of the world. This premise lay at the core of Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy. Details bored Ronald Reagan, Henry Kissinger writes: “He had absorbed a few basic ideas about the dangers of appeasement, the evils of communism, and the greatness of his own country, but analysis of substantive issues was not his forte.” Yet “Reagan put forward a foreign policy doctrine of great coherence and considerable intellectual power.”​[247]​ His perception of the fragileness of the Soviet system challenged conventional realist wisdoms, but in the end proved correct. Kissinger remarks, moreover, that the way the President grasped “the American soul” was similar more to Wilson than Theodore Roosevelt: “Like Woodrow Wilson, Reagan understood that the American people, having marched throughout their history to the drumbeat of exceptionalism, would find their ultimate inspiration in historic ideals, not in geopolitical analysis.”​[248]​
Reagan made good on his campaign promises by putting neoconservatives, and others who were deeply suspicious of detente, at high positions in his cabinet. Soon after being formed, the new administration started to make proposals on arms control that, in Gaddis’ words, “seemed designed to subvert rather than to advance that process.”​[249]​ Having always maintained that the Soviets had cheated during the detente period by deploying land-based SS-20 missiles on the European frontline, he quickly insisted that the NATO double-track decision be implemented. Largely developed by German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, this proposal called for the deployment of Pershing missiles if the Soviets would not remove their SS-20s. This proposed trade-off between actual missiles and non-existing ones was remarkable enough, and not acceptable to the Russians, who benefited strategically from their deployment. The new German Chancellor Helmut Kohl received threats from the Soviet Union that the relations between Bonn and Moscow would deteriorate sharply, should NATO proceed with the deployment, and he also faced stiff resistance by European public opinion. Yet Kohl firmly stood by the Americans, and the Pershings were finally deployed as planned.​[250]​
Meanwhile, the administration was shifting focus from arms limitation to arms reduction, initiating the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) with the Russians. But its proposal for a serious cut in land-based ICBMs implied that the Soviet Union had to make disproportionate reductions compared to the Americans, since seven out of ten of its ICBMs were land-based, as opposed to only two out of ten of American ICBMs.​[251]​ It led Reagan to be accused of being irresponsible and reckless, not least by the hundreds of thousands demonstrating in Europe against the planned Pershing deployment in 1983. The larger public, on both sides of the Atlantic, called for an immediate freeze on all production and deployment of nuclear weapons, by both the Soviet Union and the U.S.​[252]​ In a famous speech in March 1983, the President responded to their concerns:

Well, I think the refusal of many influential people to accept this elementary fact of Soviet doctrine illustrates a historical reluctance to see totalitarian powers for what they are. We saw this phenomenon in the 1930s. We see it too often today. ... We will never give away our freedom. We will never abandon our belief in God. And we will never stop searching for a genuine peace. But we can assure none of these things America stands for through the so-called nuclear freeze solutions proposed by some. The truth is that a freeze now would be a very dangerous fraud, for that is merely the illusion of peace. The reality is that we must find peace through strength.​[253]​
	
Reagan went on to state that a “nuclear freeze” at that specific moment would but reward the Soviets, leading them to no longer take the Geneva arms reductions talks seriously. To accommodate oneself to the Soviet Union was nothing other than “simpleminded appeasement or wishful thinking about our adversaries,” unworthy of a free nation.​[254]​ Therefore,

I urge you to speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority. You know, I’ve always believed that old Screwtape reserved his best efforts for those of you in the church. So, in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride - the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.​[255]​

In this passionate speech, in which he combined Woodrow Wilson’s religous zeal with Theodore Roosevelt’s military drift, the President called the Soviet Union an “evil empire.” No President before him had ever placed such a direct moral challenge to the Soviet Union.​[256]​ Above all, the United States should seek to gain overwhelming power to be able to counter the Soviet threat. In the end, however, “the struggle now going on for the world will never be decided by bombs or rockets, by armies or military might. ... [The] source of our strength in the quest for human freedom is not material, but spiritual.” Communism, Reagan believed, was “another sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages even now are being written.”​[257]​ Through saying these words, he had officially departed from the realist presumption that the Cold War equilibrium was a lasting one, and returned to a divine belief in the merits and universal appeal of American values.
Next to defending the American moral high ground, Reagan pursued bold policies that led to significant alterations in the status quo between the U.S. and the Soviet bloc. During the first five years of his presidency, the American defense spending increased with an astonishing forty percent. In 1981 alone, the defense budget was raised by fifteen percent.​[258]​ The bulk of the money went to arms buildup. Reagan deployed the new land-based continental MX missiles, and revived weapons programs that had been eliminated during the Carter presidency. The medium-range Pershing missiles in Europe were also paid for a large part by the Americans.​[259]​ The end of detente had become reality.
Reagan undertook another, very costly, military project. A mere two weeks after his “evil empire” speech, the President laid out “a vision of the future which offers hope” for ending an immoral and seemingly endless arms race:

It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. ... I’m taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose – one all people share – is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war.​[260]​

In another bold move, Reagan engaged the U.S. in a missile defense program that would render “impotent and obsolete” all nuclear arms.​[261]​ It was a rather liberal purpose, for it meant, in Kissingers words, that “The postwar president most committed to building up America’s military strength, including its nuclear capacity, stood at the same time for a pacifist vision of a world from which all nuclear weapons were banished.”​[262]​ Implementing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), if actually possible, likely also served a more cynical purpose; it would practically lead the costly Soviet nuclear arms buildup to be a waste of money, a notion that all but crushed the Soviet morale. Critics feared, therefore, that the move would push the Soviet Union into the defense, increasing the chances of a preemptive Russian first strike before the system would be able to parry it. Moreover, the European allies saw the American nuclear umbrella vaporizing above their heads, and many engineers posed questions concerning SDI’s technical feasibility.​[263]​
	Simultaneously, the administration sought to start negotiations for a mutual reduction in nuclear arms. Talks for START began in 1982, under pressure of a public opinion tired of the arms race. As already mentioned, Reagan was not really enthusiastic about negotiating with the Russians. The invocation of NATO’s double-track decision and the consequent deployment of the Pershings in 1983, under staunch American pressure, proved his skepticism toward nuclear disarmament. Yet, according to Craig and George, “Reagan does not seem to have believed that the gulf between the United States and the Soviet Union was unbridgeable. Indeed, he hoped that the Soviet leaders would one day see the light and give up their expansionist and subversive intentions ...”​[264]​ Arms reduction, in fact, would only become a key issue later in his presidency.

Jeane Kirkpatrick
Of great influence on Reagan’s foreign policy was Jeane Kirkpatrick, the American United Nations Representative during the President’s first administration. Kirkpatrick started her career as a Marxist scholar and later became a Democrat, but ended up disillusioned with her party throughout the 1970s. Though not a Republican at the time, she was a foreign policy adviser for Reagan during his 1980 campaign, after which she became U.N. ambassador. Her name was attached to the doctrine of backing authoritarian regimes in the name of defense against communism.
She built her Kirkpatrick Doctrine on the premise that there was a vast difference between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. She accused the Carter administration of wrongly assuming that the revolutions in Nicaragua and Iran were, in Ehrman’s words, “manifestations of deep historical forces which cannot be controlled,” and could not be “stopped or altered.” Stating that enforcing democracy on these regimes overnight would “fail to produce desired outcomes,” she believed that democracy could slowly develop there with active American aid.​[265]​ This was a viewpoint which Michael Doyle also seemed to adopt at the time; he cited with approval President John Kennedy’s words after the assassination of dictator Rafael Molino Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. The President stated: “There are three possibilities in descending order of preference, a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime [by his followers] or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we can’t really renounce the second until we are sure we can avoid the third.”​[266]​
Kirkpatrick, labeled a neoconservative by her fellow Democrats, came to be very critical of the course her party had followed. In a famous speech at the Republican National Convention of 1984 (she had already left the Democratic Party by then), she walked all over the liberals whom belonged to what she called the “San Fransisco Democrats:”

When the San Francisco Democrats treat foreign affairs as an afterthought, as they did, they behaved less like a dove or a hawk than like an ostrich - convinced it would shut out the world by hiding its head in the sand. ... When the Soviet Union walked out of arms control negotiations, and refused even to discuss the issues, the San Francisco Democrats didn’t blame Soviet intransigence. They blamed the United States. But then, they always blame America first. When Marxist dictators shoot their way to power in Central America, the San Francisco Democrats don’t blame the guerrillas and their Soviet allies, they blame United States policies of 100 years ago. But then, they always blame America first. The American people know better.​[267]​


The message was clear. The address became known as the “Blame America First” speech, and in fact called for nothing other than a return to the liberalism Harry Truman and his contemporary Democrats had practiced: “They were not afraid to be resolute nor ashamed to speak of America as a great nation. They didn’t doubt that we must be strong enough to protect ourselves and to help others.”​[268]​ As it was, this neoconservative formed a perfect match with the President in order to reinvigorate the American exceptionalism.
Ronald Reagan indeed more closely resembled Harry Truman, who had established NATO on the premise that the liberal democracies faced “a challenge to the honesty of our profession of the democratic faith,”​[269]​ than his fellow Republicans Nixon and Ford, who had led the United States into an “amoral” detente with the Soviet Union. Both the neoconservatives and Reagan shared the liberalism of liberals, but were most certainly no doves when it came to foreign policy.

Third World intervention and its critics
The Kirkpatrick Doctrine provided the intellectual legitimation for aiding Third World authoritarian regimes, as opposed to the Reagan Doctrine, which was aimed at backing anti-communist guerillas in Soviet client states. Together, the two doctrines brought about a coherent policy of contesting communist expansion all over the world. The administration supported anti-communist forces in Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua and Afghanistan, and backed authoritarian regimes in El Salvador and Argentina.​[270]​ In 1983, American forces overthrew a communist regime in Grenada, and in 1986, they bombed Libya, in retaliation to the bombing of a Berlin discotheque by Libyans. (The discotheque was reputed to host lots of American visitors, and the bomb killed one American soldier.)​[271]​ These were aggressive policies, serving the purpose of containment, but even going beyond it.
Reagan has often been praised by liberals and conservatives (of whatever brand) alike for these vigorous pro-democratic and anti-communist policies. Michael Doyle, for one, generally refered to the President with much approval. In a 1986 article, he quoted another famous speech by Reagan, in which the latter drew a specific connection between peace and democracy.​[272]​ Noting that the democracies had refused to use their 1940s and 1950s nuclear monopoly for territorial gains, whereas the Soviet Union would certainly have done so, the President stated “that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings,” and called for “a crusade for freedom that will engage the faith and fortitude of the next generation. For the sake of peace and justice, let us move toward a world in which all people are at last free to determine their own destiny.”​[273]​
For all his support, Doyle at the time was a little ambiguous about the fact that the President’s words did not always match his deeds with regard to these issues. This ambiguity was justified. Cold War intervention of the U.S. in the Third World was not always based on such liberal principles, since the administration often found itself actively aiding illiberal, rightwing regimes and militias in its struggle against socialist regimes and rebellions. Many liberals shared Doyle’s doubts. They were careful not to come across as too “anti-American,” and based their critique on the administration on two arguments. First, its staunch opposition to radical leftist movements, especially in Nicaragua, practically drove that country into the hands of the Soviet Union, so its policy was but counterproductive. Second, they feared that the administration would get involved in another “Vietnam-type quagmire for U.S. military forces.”​[274]​ These two points of criticism were pragmatic rather than moral.
Moral arguments were not absent in American public opinion, however. More radical analysts held the administrations policy to be “not only misguided but deeply villainous.”​[275]​ They regarded intervention in Latin America as motivated by a desire to maintain global dominance and defend capitalism rather than to secure liberalism and democracy. The fear that social change in the Third World would disadvantage the United States has, according to these commentators, led to a policy which has not rarely brought advantage to authoritarian regimes and brought hardship to the poor. Therefore, these liberals thought, in Dario Moreno’s words, that “supporting the status quo has made the United States the biggest terrorist state of all.”​[276]​ The fact that the U.S. organized and directed terrorist forces in El Salvador and Nicaragua reinforced this perception. Thomas Bodenheimer and Robert Gould stated that “U.S. postwar policy, generally called containment, on closer inspection is actually a hidden policy of selective, deliberate overthrow of governments in the Third World, with the ultimate long-term goal of disintegration or ‘mellowing’ of socialism in the Soviet Union.”​[277]​ William Robinson and Kent Norsworthy went as far as calling the Reagan Doctrine “a radical response to the long-term decline of U.S. imperialism in the face of successful war of national liberation.”​[278]​
These hostile accounts do not do sufficient justice to the threat of “another Cuba” in the American “backyard,” a scenario that would have seriously deteriorated the strategic position of the U.S. in the face of the Soviet threat. Moreover, as Dinesh D’Souza puts it, in the case of Nicaragua “one form of tyranny promptly gave way to another. Somoza was replaced by the Sandinistas, who suspended civil liberties and established a Marxist-style dictatorship.” D’Souza argues that “Critics of United States foreign policy judge it by a standard that they apply to no one else.”​[279]​ That notion unmistakably holds true. Yet the administration to some extent put this liberal burden upon itself by preaching liberal rhetoric. Its policies with regard to the Third World posed serious dilemmas to the liberals, who felt that the President was merely pursuing raw economic and strategic interests rather than spreading freedom and democracy. Reagan was, in their eyes, doing nothing other than abusing their agenda.
In general, however, it would go too far to call Reagan a realist. Like most Presidents before him, he held a quintessential belief in the merits of American values, and was in fact elected, in Kissinger’s words, “in reaction to a period of America’s seeming retreat to reaffirm the traditional verities of American exceptionalism.”​[280]​ Liberalism and democracy, Reagan thought, would indeed produce peace, but this peace would not enforce itself. In the 1980s, the greatest threat to the liberal democracies was Soviet communism, not rightwing illiberal regimes in Latin America. Yet would these regimes give way to socialist dictatorships propped up by the Soviet Union, those might seriously harm U.S. strategic interests and the strength of the liberal democratic bloc in general. It was a realist legitimation for a liberal cause, and quite reconcilable with Theodore Roosevelt’s assertion that “an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation.”​[281]​

The end of the Soviet Union
Although some neoconservatives have in retrospect suggested otherwise, Reagan was not a true neoconservative in many respects. In fact, toward the end of his eight-year presidency, neoconservatives increasingly came to criticize some of his policies. In particular, after spending almost his entire first term on tough policies toward the Soviet Union, his second term was marked by a sharp reversal. That shift even preceded the shift in Soviet leadership, Beth Fisher contends.​[282]​ It even led Norman Podhoretz to note that “The President’s warmest friends and his most virulent enemies imagined that they had found in him a champion of the old conservative dream of going beyond containment of Communism to the ‘rollback’ of Communist influence and power and the ‘liberation’ of the Soviet empire. The truth, however, is that Mr. Reagan as President has never shown the slightest inclination to pursue such an ambitious strategy.”​[283]​ The President, though, understood that pragmatism and negotiations would be needed should the United States ever be able to resolve the Cold War. He actually hinted at such a resolution a few times before, in personal letters to Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov.​[284]​ As mentioned before, Reagan did not see the gap between the two blocs as unbridgeable. He was waiting for the right moment, and that moment seemed to have come when Mikhail Gorbachev became secretary general of the Communist Party.
Gorbachev knew that the political and economic illnesses of his state were many. The consequences of military overexpansion and decades-long mismanagement of the Soviet economy were dramatic. The Soviet Union was engaged in an all-out arms race it could never sustain, and its political system had actively discouraged any independent thinking and initiative, which had been the key ingredients for the successful capitalist economies of the West.​[285]​ It had military forces in Afghanistan, a country which was on the verge of turning into a next Vietnam, and it faced increasing difficulties in maintaining order in its satellites in Central and Eastern Europe.​[286]​ “This society is ready for change,” Gorbachev wrote in his 1987 book Perestroika. “The need for it has existed for a long time. Postponing the start of Perestroika could have deteriorated the domestic situation on the short run, and that situation could have, to put it frankly, included the risk of severe social, economic and political crisis situations.”​[287]​ As it was, a crisis was at hand in the Soviet empire anyway.
Reagan in his turn believed it was his mission to make Gorbachev recognize that they could lead the superpowers toward conciliation, if only the Soviet leader would see the light. The President did not believe in irreconcilable interests, and therefore not in an enduring balance of power. This was a quintessential liberal worldview, even though the means to reach it were realist power politics.​[288]​ In the process of convincing Gorbachev of all this, the two men became close personal friends. 
	When the Reagan administration began serious negotiations with Gorbachev about arms reductions, the latter had little choice but to be cooperative. During the 1986 Reykjavik summit, the two men agreed to reduce strategic forces by fifty percent within five years and to eliminate all ballistic missiles within ten. The reductions might have been even sharper, had Reagan not refused to compromise on his Strategic Defense Initiative.​[289]​ SDI left the Soviet leader somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand he was very suspicious toward Reagan’s intentions, as the project meant a severe strategic blow to the Soviet Union. On the other hand he could seize the opportunity to cancel further expansion of nuclear programs, which were financially unsustainable.​[290]​ The Reykjavik summit was a breakthrough of some sorts, but left the two leaders unsatisfied anyway.
	After Reykjavik, the two men embarked on intensive negotiations to cut their respective arms arsenals. These talks, however, proceeded too slowly to address the Soviet Union’s most basic problem, namely that the arms race was draining it of its finances. By the end of 1988, Gorbachev stated in a speech to the U.N. that the Soviet Union would cut its troops by half a million, and its tanks by a hundred thousand, including half of the tanks on the European front line. It was a unilateral reduction in its conventional military, although he hoped that NATO would follow. According to his spokesman, the reason for Gorbachev’s step was that the Soviet Union wanted to break the “endlessly repeated myth of the Soviet threat.”​[291]​ It is more likely, however, that the move was a product of the inner weakness of the Soviet Union. As its domestic situation was deteriorating, Gorbachev had little options left.
Either way, the Russians were gradually outrun strategically, and not only on the nuclear level. As Kissinger contends, Ronald Reagan had managed “to develop a foreign policy of extraordinary consistency and relevance.”​[292]​ The revived arms race had left the Soviet Union all but bankrupt, and then SDI seemingly had led it to be but worthless. It fought a war in Afghanistan it could not win, partly thanks to the American efforts of aiding the Mujahedeen. Throughout the Third World it was supporting rebel groups and leftwing regimes, but financial means were on the American side. It lacked the moral legitimacy in its sphere of influence in Europe the U.S. did enjoy, even though Western Europeans no longer took the American righteousness for granted. Finally, its domestic economy was in ruins. The Soviet Union was degenerated, both politically and economically, and also morally bankrupt. The unilateral military cuts Gorbachev made in 1988 were, in Kissinger’s words, “the ultimate vindication of Kennan’s containment theory.”​[293]​
Nevertheless, the collapse of the communist bloc came rather sudden for outside observers. After Germany rushed to reunification from 1989 onward, other satellites followed, and finally the Soviet Union itself also fell apart, as the Baltic states broke away in 1990. Gorbachev’s attempts to reform, and so maintain Russia’s great power status, had failed. In 1991, president Boris Yeltsin of the Russian republic proclaimed Russia’s independence from the Soviet Union, thereby in fact breaking it up altogether.​[294]​
Scholars have debated vigorously who, if anyone, was responsible for ending the Cold War. Francis Fukuyama contends in The End of History and the Last Man that the true weakness of the Soviet state lay in the legitimacy of its system. People knew “that their government was lying to them,” and “remained enormously angry at the personal sufferings they had endured under Stalinism.”​[295]​ The Marxist Eric Hobsbawm argues in The Age of Extremes that, contrary to conventional wisdoms in the West, there was hardly a grassroots movement for political and economic change in the Soviet republics and the satellite states: “In fact it came, as it had to come, from the top.” He points at the absence of real popular uprisings in most of the communist bloc to support this claim.​[296]​ Realists before 1989 would have nodded with approval. Samuel Huntington, for one, wrote in 1968 that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were “a political community with an overwhelming consensus among the people on the legitimacy of the political system.”​[297]​
	A liberal peace of work, the thesis of Fukuyama’s book is that liberal democracy has become the only legitimate form of government, since fascism and communism have lost all moral legitimacy they once enjoyed. Yet in his latest book America at the Crossroads Fukuyama argues that the neoconservatives have derived one flawed assumption from the end of the Cold War, namely that their own policy directives had led the West to “win” it. As he writes, “an event as massive as the collapse of the former USSR had many causes, some deeply embedded in the nature of the Soviet system ... and others accidental and contingent ...”​[298]​ The interpretation most closely to the truth, therefore, is probably that the Reagan administration accelerated the demise of the Soviet bloc, or at most tipped the balance. Nevertheless, the revolutions raging on the European continent left the neoconservatives with a self-confidence and respect they had not enjoyed until that point.​[299]​







Neoconservatism in the twenty-first century

To the utter dismay of the neoconservatives, the United States from the 1990s onward started to cash in on its peace dividend. The administrations of both George Bush and Bill Clinton made substantial cuts in the American defense budget. Moreover, even the United Nations started the 1990s with optimism. The Security Council adopted resolution 678 on November 29, 1990, stating that the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait constituted a threat to the international peace and security. This was excactly the kind of case the U.N. had been established in 1945 to address, and the fact that the (former) great powers were able to reach a consensus might set a precedent for international decisionmaking in the new era, it was hoped. Resolution 678 was without precedent itself, of course. Throughout the Cold War, both superpowers had paralyzed the Security Council and de facto based the international arena on a realist balance of power.
	The optimism concerning this new pluralist moment was not shared by the neoconservatives. Just as they criticized the complacency of many Americans regarding defense spending, they thought it an illusion that the U.N. would be able to promote peace and security now the Cold War had ended. Jeane Kirkpatrick, herself U.N. ambassador under Reagan, writes in retrospect about her job at the U.N that “The original language of the UN was that of the UN Charter, an idealistic internationalist version of liberal democracy. But the democratic structure of the UN guaranteed that the views and values of new nations entering the UN would be quickly reflected in the organization. And many of those views and values were very different.”​[301]​ Kirkpatrick was, in fact, a disciple of the democratic peace theory, as she stated at the time that “Democratic nations don’t start wars.”​[302]​ That notion, however, implicated little if the majority of states were illiberal dictatorships. She, and many neoconservatives with her, shared with realists a deep suspicion of international law, but on a different premise. Whereas realists would contend that a balance of power based on common interests would be more effective in maintaining the peace than laws, neoconservatives believed that illiberal regimes would not respect international law, since they would not even respect the rule of law at home. Both thus rejected pluralism, but, contrary to the realists, the neoconservatives believed that in a world full of democracies the U.N. might have worked. The latters’ arguments remained popular throughout the 1990s, when many states yet failed to become liberal democracies. 
	The new security challenges of the West lay in preserving and enforcing human rights throughout the world. With the only remaining superpower taking the lead, a number of humanitarian interventions were undertaken, aiming to save individuals within another state’s borders. In 1991, allied powers created safe havens for the Kurdish and Shiite minorities in Iraq, to protect them from aggression by Saddam Hussein’s regime.​[303]​ Under President George Bush, the U.S. took the lead in a disastrous intervention in Somalia to stop the famine in that country.​[304]​ A distinct humanitarian moment started when the Democrat Bill Clinton became President in 1993. Although his administration did little to prevent almost a million people from being killed in the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the bloody breakup of Yugoslavia led it to intervene again, assuming command of a NATO force in the European backyard. The Yugoslav case culminated in the 1999 Kosovo War against the Serb regime of Slobodan Milosevic.​[305]​
	A few times these humanitarian interventions were mandated by the U.N. Security Council, but many were based on rather fragile legal grounds, if on any. When they did have a  U.N. mandate, it was based on a Russian and Chinese approval, albeit reluctant, with the notion that these often intrastate atrocities constituted a threat to international peace and security. However, Russia and China, themselves not always guarantors of human rights within their own borders, in many cases took a rather skeptical stance. After all, mandating these interventions might set a precedent that could later turn against themselves.
For liberals in the West, moreover, the  new practice posed a serious dilemma as well. On the one hand, the pluralists saw international law as the key in preserving order in the international society, and viewed the interventions as violating the state sovereignty guaranteed by the U.N. Charter. (Realists, who rejected what they perceived the pluralist’s ignorance regarding their faith in international law, nevertheless shared their views in this respect. Violating state sovereignty for the sake of human rights, they argued, would disturb the balance of power.)​[306]​ On the other hand, solidarists started from the premise that liberalism was supposed to, in the words of Robert Kagan, “[cherish] the rights and liberties of the individual and [to define] progress as the greater protection of these rights and liberties across the globe.”​[307]​ This implicated that in some cases they had to be protected from tyrannical regimes. In this view, sovereignty but imposed a barrier behind which dictators could protect themselves from external involvement in domestic affairs.
	In any case, the humanitarian moment of the 1990s was hardly based on an American acceptance of a U.N.-dominated global order. After the limited success of the 1991 Gulf War, all optimism vaporized with the failed intervention in Somalia, where a rather limited and neutral mandate did not prevent U.S. forces from undertaking a Wild West hunt for a belligerent warlord, in which 18 American marines were killed.​[308]​ In the 1999 Kosovo War, Clinton and the European leaders bypassed the U.N. altogether, thereby infuriating Russia and China, and a large part of the public at home. Clinton was not so radically different from his successor Bush as many have noted in retrospect. The difference is that he cared more about the opinion of his European allies than Bush would later. Clinton was a multilateralist, but most certainly no distinct pluralist. His multilateralism, moreover, might have quickly disappeared had he faced such a challenge to national security as Bush did just nine months after becoming President of the United States. For the real “revolution” took off on September 11, 2001. As it was, these attacks also made the humanitarian moment of the 1990s lose its momentum.
	Nevertheless, the first Bush and Clinton presidencies were perceived to mark a clear departure from the rather belligerent and anti-pluralist attitude of the Reagan administration. Although we have seen that the latter actually abandoned many of his tough policies and rhetoric toward the end of his tenure, it was his hard line which remained in the memory of many neoconservatives. Spending the 1990s in “exile,” some of them formulated a rather coherent foreign policy ideology, for a large part reactionary to the policies of Bush and Clinton. The most prominent propagators of their ideas were Robert Kagan and William Kristol (Irving’s son). These two authors developed an “expansive, interventionist, democracy-promoting position that has come to be seen today as the essence of neoconservatism,” Francis Fukuyama writes.​[309]​ 	
	In a series of books and articles which reminds one of Roosevelt, Mahan and Lodge’s efforts to influence the public, Kagan and Kristol put forward their analysis of the strategic reality of the post-Cold War world, and consequently issued some rather bold policy directives. In 1996, they plead for a return to a “neo-Reaganite” foreign policy. Strongly disapproving of the Clinton administration’s cuts in defense spending, they also noted that conservatives lacked a coherent foreign policy ideology. Instead, they were flip-flopping between Nixonian realism and isolationism. Republicans disdained the Wilsonianism of the Clinton administration, but provided no plausible alternative themselves. Kagan and Kristol presented one for them:

A neo-Reaganite foreign policy would be good for conservatives, good for America, and good for the world. It is worth recalling that the most successful Republican presidents of this century, Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, both inspired Americans to assume cheerfully the new international responsibilities that went with increased power and influence. Both celebrated American exceptionalism. Both made Americans proud of their leading role in world affairs. Deprived of the support of an elevated patriotism, bereft of the ability to appeal to national honor, conservatives will ultimately fail in their effort to govern America. And Americans will fail in their responsibility to lead the world.​[310]​

Four years later, their continued disapproval of Republicans and Democrats alike led them to note that “The 1990s, for all their peace and prosperity, were a squandered decade.”​[311]​ The U.S. had failed to take its responsibility since the end of the Cold War, which “was to prolong this extraordinary moment and to guard the international system from any threats that might challenge it. This meant, above all, preserving and reinforcing America’s benevolent global hegemony, ... to turn what Charles Krauthammer called a ‘unipolar moment’ into a unipolar era.”​[312]​ The terms “benevolent hegemony” and “unipolar moment” are key to Kagan and Kristol’s views. Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, and the dictatorships in North Korea and China continued to pose serious threats to the U.S. throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium, a notion the two authors thought unacceptable. These dictators could “challenge the peace, slaughter innocents in their own or in neighboring states, threaten their neighbors with missile attacks – and still hang on to power.” Instead of confronting them, “the United States engaged in a gradual but steady moral and strategic disarmament ... to the point where its ability to defend its interests and deter future challenges is now in doubt.” As a result, “ten years from now ... we likely will be living in a world in which Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and China all possess the ability to strike the continental United States with nuclear weapons.”​[313]​
The end of the Cold War had seen an unprecedented spread of liberal democracy, up to the point where Fukuyama predicted “the end of history.”​[314]​ The new foreign policy, in which liberal internationalist humanitarian interventions became a central feature, reflected this change. Yet Kagan and Kristol accused the Clinton administration but also conservatives of returning to “normalcy,” meaning that it wanted the U.S. to act “like any great power on the international scene, looking to secure only its immediate, tangible interests, and abjuring the broader responsibilities it had once assumed as leader of the Free World.”​[315]​ In other words, the U.S. was taking a rather “humble” place in the global, multipolar balance of power. This was in sharp contrast with great presidencies in the past, Kagan and Kristol wrote. The Roosevelts and Truman had developed enlightened policies that “aspired to greatness for America,”​[316]​ and their legacy should not be so easily forgotten: 

In the post-Cold War era, the maintenance of a decent and hospitable international order requires continued American leadership in resisting, and where possible undermining, rising dictators and hostile ideologies; in supporting American interests and liberal democratic principles; and in providing assistance to those struggling against the more extreme manifestations of human evil. If America refrains from shaping this order, we can be sure that others will shape it in ways that reflect neither our interests nor our values.​[317]​

As a bold alternative to the conventional approach of what they perceived to be appeasing of dictators around the world, Kagan and Kristol developed the concept of “regime change.” They argued that it would be difficult for the U.S. to sustain friendly relations with dictatorships, since “the force of American ideals and the influence of the international economic system, both of which are upheld by American power and influence, tend to corrode the pillars on which authoritarian and totalitarian regimes rest. ... With no means of acquiring legitimacy for their domestic politics, they ... seek the nationalist legitimacy that comes from ‘standing up’ to an external enemy.”​[318]​ The U.S, Kagan and Kristol thought, would never be able to persuade these regimes to play by the rules. Therefore, “The most effective form of non-proliferation when it comes to regimes such as those in North Korea and Iraq is not a continuing effort to bribe them into adhering to international arms control agreements, but an effort to bring about the demise of the regimes themselves.”​[319]​ This did not implicate that the U.S. should dispatch troops to every place where a regime was established it did not like. Yet some cases, they argued, were obvious targets for preemptive regime change; had the U.S. taken this responsibility in Iraq in 1991 and in Yugoslavia in 1995, it would have prevented more horror from having occurred and more means from being spent on the long run.​[320]​
Supporters of the idea that America’s interests and universal ideals more than often converge, Kristol and Kagan put forward a plea for the U.S. to wield its power to promote liberalism and democracy throughout the world. Indeed, according to the website of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), an educational organization they founded in 1997, “American leadership is good both for America and for the world.”​[321]​ They thought the interests and values of liberal democracies and illiberal regimes to clash inevitably, and international agreements would not be sufficient to change behavior of dictators. This was an outright appeal to the democratic peace theory, which they subsequently applied to what they perceived to be the strategic imperatives of the U.S: to use its “benevolent hegemony” to eliminate the threats facing it, thereby reshaping the world according to the American image. This meant spreading, or rather enforcing, democracy throughout the globe, since democracies, they claimed, would not fight each other.
In the aftermath of the transatlantic crisis over Iraq, Kagan posed a challenging question for the European leaders (whom he had earlier accused of having established a perpetual peace among themselves, but consequently being blind for the threats facing the liberal West ​[322]​). His rhetorical question revealed his utter pessimism concerning pluralism:

Since the United States first began openly contemplating the invasion of Iraq, Europe’s answer has been to look to the Security Council. “The United Nations is the place where international rules and legitimacy are founded,” de Villepin declared before the Security Council in March 2003, “because it speaks in the name of peoples.” But is the Security Council really the ultimate depositary of international legitimacy, as Europeans insist today? International life would be simpler if it were. But it is not. Ever since the UN’s creation almost six decades ago, the Security Council has failed to function as the UN’s more idealistic founders intended.​[323]​

It was a fairly legitimate analysis, since the Security Council consists of nothing more than sovereign states, and its resolutions have never been autonomous legal verdicts. Throughout the U.N.’s existence, the veto powers have been using the Security Council to pursue national interests, which did not always go hand in hand with promoting international peace and security. In any case, Robert Kagan showed to be little different from Theodore Roosevelt, Lodge, Truman, Acheson, Kissinger and Reagan, nor from the President who came to identify himself with Kagan’s brand of neoconservatism.

Neoconservatives back in power
George W. Bush became President of the United States in 2001 on a campaign with an essentially realist foreign policy agenda. “The Clinton administration,” the future National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice wrote in Foreign Affairs, had been unable to separate “the important from the trivial.”​[324]​ Bush railed against the overcommitment of American troops abroad, for causes that did not serve America’s vital interests. The American military was trained for combat, not for policing a ceasefire, the Republicans argued. Moreover, their disdain for pluralism was clearly visible in Rice’s article:

Power matters, both the exercise of power by the United States and the ability of others to exercise it. Yet many in the United States are (and have always been) uncomfortable with the notions of power politics, great powers, and power balances. In an extreme form, this discomfort leads to a reflexive appeal instead to notions of international law and norms, and the belief that the support of many states – or even better, of institutions like the United Nations – is essential to the legitimate exercise of power. The “national interest” is replaced with “humanitarian interests” or the interests of “the international community.” ... To be sure, there is nothing wrong with doing something that benefits all humanity, but that is, in a sense, a second-order effect.​[325]​

	In an election campaign, facts are often blown out of proportion. As we have seen earlier, Clinton was not such a principled pluralist either. He indeed negotiated the Kyoto Protocol on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but he deliberately did not submit it to the Republican-dominated Senate, where he knew it would be rejected.​[326]​ Moreover, Clinton had also been the first to demand that U.S. forces be immune from prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Kagan writes that the Clinton administration was in fact not at all too enthusiastic about these two treaties.​[327]​ Finally, it should be noted that Clinton was already negotiating with Russia on adding additional protocols to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, in order to clear the way for America’s renewed commitment to SDI.​[328]​
Yet the speed with which the newly elected Bush administration withdrew from these international commitments altogether stunned the world, and certainly backed up its campaign assertion that treaty laws were but limiting the foreign policy options of the U.S. In no European country such an argument would have done well with the public. Yet George W. Bush appealed to a public that had in fact only twice in its history had a moment of support for pluralism. The first was right after World War II, and only occurred because of people’s fear of more military commitments abroad. As soon as the U.N.’s complete inability to preserve international peace and security became apparent, the Americans were pulled into an enormous and perhaps permanent military commitment in Europe, by an administration which hardly held warm sympathies for the U.N. either. The second pluralist moment was at the time of the 1991 Gulf War, and similarly died prematurely. The man becoming President in 2001 was in this respect hardly a new phenomenon, and indeed faced relatively little domestic criticism when he canceled U.S. commitment to the Kyoto, ABM, and ICC treaties.
George W. Bush was a man in the tradition of Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan. Born in Connecticut, he grew up in Texas. He received a Bachelor’s degree in History from Yale, and, after serving in the U.S. military, he received a Master of Business Administration from Harvard.​[329]​ A realist though he appeared to be previous to the elections, he shared with Truman and Reagan a quintessential belief in the American exceptionalism. “We have a place, all of us,” Bush stated in his first Inaugural Address, “in a long story – a story we continue, but whose end we will not see. It is the story of a new world that became a friend and liberator of the old, a story of a slave-holding society that became a servant of freedom, the story of a power that went into the world to protect but not possess, to defend but not to conquer.”​[330]​ His rhetoric about the merits of democracy also left little room for believing he was a realist: “Our democratic faith is more than the creed of our country, it is the inborn hope of our humanity, an ideal we carry but do not own, a trust we bear and pass along.”​[331]​
	Would the horrible attacks of 2001 never have happened, however, it is doubtful that the President would ever have embarked on a democratic crusade the way he did during the rest of his first term. In fact, Robert Kagan stated during the election period that “Republicans are good at wielding power, but they are not so wonderful when it comes to the more idealistic motives of liberal internationalism. The Democrats are better at liberal internationalism, but they’re not so good at wielding power.”​[332]​ This quote captures the essence of his rigid positioning between both American foreign policy legacies. Unlike their liberal counterparts of what they called the “New Left,” Kagan and other neoconservatives were prepared to back their liberalism with realist power politics. Unipolarity became the new balance of power, and it was the best guarantee to further American principles and interests. Until the Indian summer of 2001, this expansionist foreign policy view was hardly supported by the President, who conducted his foreign policy on realist terms.
What 9/11 made clear, however, was that the status quo in the Middle East, made up by illiberal dictators who were often supported by the West, had in fact fed resentment, and therefore had led al-Qaeda to gain power. Columnist Thomas Friedman hit the nail on the head: “When Hindus kill Muslims it’s not a story, because there are a billion Hindus and they aren’t part of the Muslim narrative. ... But when a small band of Israeli Jews kills Muslims it sparks rage – a rage that must come from Muslims having to confront the gap between their self-perception as Muslims and the reality of the Muslim world.” It is “this poverty of dignity, not a poverty of money,” which causes the rage of mostly young, educated Muslims in the Middle East, Friedman writes.​[333]​
	The twisted irony of the matter is that many Arab dictatorships, who have not rarely been supported by the West for cracking down on terrorists, have actually stirred up and sustained these anti-Western and anti-Zionist sympathies among their peoples. Instead of developing their countries and bringing wealth to their populations, Arab leaders have generated legitimacy by “standing up” to an external enemy, namely the U.S. and Israel, thereby covering their own impotence. Many people in the Arab street have seen their countries modernize, but have remained on the sidelines. The obvious answer for some was a return to a pure form of Islam, and a total elimination of all Western influences in the Muslim world. This is, in fact, the goal Osama bin Laden has been pursuing for most of his life, and it is a rather political goal. As James Kiras writes, “Religion is a powerful motivator but is not the end for which terrorism ... is undertaken.”​[334]​ Al-Qaeda’s objectives were the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Gulf, the elimination of the state of Israel, and the replacement of what it perceived to be illegitimate Middle Eastern regimes with an Islamic Caliphate.​[335]​
	The obvious first step following the terrorist attacks was to take out those who allegedly had been directly involved in them, and evidence pointed at Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. A few years earlier, al-Qaeda had found a safe haven in Afghanistan, in which it was initially established to fight the Russian occupation during the 1980s. The religious, totalitarian Taliban regime was not keen to hand over bin Laden and other terrorists, however, thereby defying the superpower. “The Taliban must turn over al-Qaeda and must destroy the terrorist camps, otherwise there will be a consequence,” Bush stated on October 2. “There are no negotiations, there’s no calendar. We’ll act on our time.”​[336]​ When the U.S. went to war even that same week, the administration justified it by invoking article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which provides states with the right to self-defense. The accusation that the Taliban had been complicit in 9/11 was sufficient for Secretary General Kofi Annan to give his consent to this argument.

Legitimizing the war on Iraq
The political reality in the Middle East matched perfectly with the foreign policy ideology of neoconservatives. After all, Kagan and Kristol’s assertion that the nature of illiberal regimes was incompatible with American values was applicable to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, but also to the regimes of Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, and perhaps even Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Only weeks after major combat in Afghanistan had ceased, Bush declared in his first State of the Union that “our war against terror is only beginning.” 

Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September 11th. But we know their true nature. … [North Korea, Iran and Iraq], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic. ... And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation’s security.​[337]​

Once more, the similarity with Presidents of the past is striking. Bush had described the challenge his nation was facing in a remarkable cocktail of liberalism and realism, mixing national interests with the liberal notion of good and evil.
	The administration expanded the scope of its “war on terror” so that it included not only persons involved in terrorism but also states allegedly supporting them. “Today,” Bush declared a year later in his 2003 State of the Union, “the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons for blackmail, terror, and mass murder. They could also give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies, who would use them without the least hesitation.”​[338]​ Extensively reciting the Iraqi efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction in the previous twelve years, and the atrocities Saddam had already committed against his own people, Bush warned the Americans that 9/11 might be repeated with chemical or biological warfare, provided by the Iraqis. The U.S. would not let it come that far, but would, if necessary, lead a coalition to disarm Saddam. “We seek peace,” Bush stated. “We strive for peace. And sometimes peace must be defended. A future lived at the mercy of terrible threats is no peace at all.”​[339]​ He concluded by saying: “Americans are a free people, who know that freedom is the right of every person and the future of every nation. The liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world, it is God’s gift to humanity.”​[340]​
	The purpose of a potential war was clearly the pursuit of interests, and even that motivation posed some serious questions. The fact that the U.S. did not find weapons of mass destruction after major combat had ceased, Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith remarked in retrospect,

... shouldn’t blind us to the larger point. ... Saddam’s regime was recognized widely as a threat to world peace since at least 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Saddam had launched aggressive attacks against a number of countries in his region, his military was the first in history to use nerve gas on the battlefield, he was outspokenly hostile to the United States and defiant of numerous attempts by the U.N. Security Council, over a dozen years or so, to constrain him and compel him to account for and destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.​[341]​

This remark was understandable, as many observers in the heat of the debate seemed to have forgotten that the Iraq crisis did not come out of the blue in 2002. Yet British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s notion that Saddam could fire his WMD within 45 minutes later proved to be based on flawed, if any, intelligence, and was rightly criticized by British MPs.​[342]​ Already before the war, these doubts were raised by analysts. The liberal author Paul Berman wrote in early 2003 that the issue of Saddam’s WMD was “less than supremely urgent,”​[343]​ and Thomas Friedman stated that “Saddam Hussein poses no direct threat to us today.”​[344]​
Another justification for the Iraq war was also subject of heavy debating even before one shot had been fired: the alleged connection between Saddam and al-Qaeda. Berman called this argument “unconvincing” in his book, even though he did not principally oppose the war at the time.​[345]​ The argument relied on some rather circumstantial evidence, which Stephen Hayes has documented in his book The Connection. Hayes’ thesis that there was indeed a link between Saddam and al-Qaeda is based on a few intelligence documents. One is a twenty-page list, compiled by Iraqi intelligence, with the names of individuals “whom the Iraqi regime considers intelligence assets.” The list actually includes Osama bin Laden himself, yet it was not found until after the invasion.​[346]​ Another piece of evidence is a report on an alleged meeting between Mohammed Atta (the 9/11 hijacker from Hamburg) and an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague.​[347]​ Too much of Hayes’ book, however, rests on public letters and reports from administration officials to Congress. These documents obviously serve a political purpose, next to an informative one.
Nevertheless, signs for “the connection” did exist, as did a fair suspicion that Saddam indeed possessed WMD. Yet these allegations were fragile. To assess why the Bush administration came to adopt them as a casus belli anyway, we need not hang on to bizarre conspiracy theories concerning the influence of the big oil companies or the Jewish lobby. They key lies in the perception that America’s interests converge with the supremacy of its ideals, which has guided neoconservatism throughout its existence. Men like Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Douglas Feith, all of whom held high positions in the administration, believed that no matter how much pressure the U.S. would exercise, Iraq could not be persuaded to play by the rules of the game. Its regime rested on a legitimacy generated by a defiance of the U.S. and Israel, not the consent of its citizens. Even the weakest indication that Saddam was endangering the U.S. consequently became a case for regime change. The neoconservatives concluded that, in the words of Irwin Stelzer, “by spreading democracy the West best insures the maintenance of a peaceful and prosperous world order.”​[348]​ They saw this “nexus between democracy and security” as an imperative for an assertive yet benign U.S. foreign policy.​[349]​
It should be noted that most key members of George W. Bush’s first administration were no neoconservatives: consider National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Vice-President Dick Cheney, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Especially the latter two are hawkish realists, who put American interests above anything else and would have the U.S. fight its enemies wherever they might occur. The decision to go to war in Iraq is most likely a product of two lines of argument. On the one hand, the reasons propagated by men such as Cheney and Rumsfeld were that Saddam could no longer be allowed to threat the U.S. and its allies with his weapons. On the other hand the neoconservatives believed that the best way to achieve that goal would be to remove the Iraqi regime altogether and put a democracy in its place. When the WMD were not found, obviously the justification shifted toward the democratization argument.
It is the notion that a lack of freedom, liberalism and democracy in the Middle East has fueled terrorism which has persisted in the administration’s rhetoric. In his 2006 State of the Union, President Bush contended:

Abroad, our nation is committed to an historic, long-term goal: We seek the end of tyranny in our world. Some dismiss that goal as misguided idealism. In reality, the future security of America depends on it. On September the 11th, 2001, we found that problems originating in a failed and oppressive state 7,000 miles away could bring murder and destruction to our country. Dictatorships shelter terrorists, and feed resentment and radicalism, and seek weapons of mass destruction. Democracies replace resentment with hope, respect the rights of their citizens and their neighbors, and join the fight against terror.  Every step toward freedom in the world makes our country safer, and so we will act boldly in freedom’s cause.​[350]​

It implicated nothing less than a staunch belief of the President in the democratic peace theory. This speech, therefore, had neoconservatism written all over it.
Of course, neoconservatism should not be seen as a single, homogeneous movement aiming to have the U.S. unilaterally fight monsters wherever they might occur. As Irwin Stelzer points out, neoconservatism is a mere “tendency” with multiple wings rather than a single current. Many of its thinkers do not want the U.S. to rely solely on “hard power” and unilateralism.​[351]​ Charles Krauthammer, a self-styled “neocon,” said in 2004 that the American idea of spreading democracy “must be tempered in its universalistic aspirations. It must be targeted, focused and limited. We are friends to all, but we come ashore only where it really counts.”​[352]​ This is, indeed, liberalism with a very realist touch. Nevertheless, the Bush administration after 9/11 came to identify itself with the Kagan/Kristol brand of neoconservatism. Its foreign policy, therefore, cannot be understood without noting its desire to wield the “unipolar moment,” in order to change the global status quo in a way that is favourable to both the United States and the world.
Adhering to this both liberal and realist notion did not include, however, a preference for multilateral, pluralist solutions. The U.S. should “go it alone,” should that option best serve its interests. With an administration that consisted of realists who thought pluralism to render American foreign policy but inflexible, and neoconservatives who believed that international law would not be able to constrain tyrants, this could hardly have come as a surprise to the world. In a lengthy television speech to the American people, George Bush explained why the U.S. would indeed go to war, even without a U.N. mandate:
Peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime have failed again and again -- because we are not dealing with peaceful men. ... The United States of America has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security. ... America tried to work with the United Nations to address this threat because we wanted to resolve the issue peacefully. ... One reason the UN was founded after the second world war was to confront aggressive dictators, actively and early, before they can attack the innocent and destroy the peace. ... Yet, some permanent members of the Security Council have publicly announced they will veto any resolution that compels the disarmament of Iraq. These governments share our assessment of the danger, but not our resolve to meet it. Many nations, however, do have the resolve and fortitude to act against this threat to peace, and a broad coalition is now gathering to enforce the just demands of the world. The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours.​[353]​

The war on Iraq started on March 20, 2003, with a short series of cruise missile attacks and strikes by stealth aircraft, aimed at taking out Saddam Hussein himself.​[354]​ In a matter of weeks, U.S. forces had the entire country under their occupation, and a comprehensive economic and political nation-building process took off. America had defied the world by waging a controversial war without U.N. consent. The decision to “go it alone” produced a shockwave in capitals everywhere, and to many was a confirmation of their initial distrust toward the administration, fed by its abandonment of the Kyoto, ABM, and ICC treaties. One poll by the French daily Le Monde showed that as many as 25 percent of the French said they hoped Saddam would actually win the war, not the Americans.​[355]​ It was striking that even in an allied country the war stirred up such heavy sentiments. In virtually the whole world anti-Americanism was gaining enormous momentum.
	It hardly needs to be said that the legitimacy of this neoconservative project is all but gone. Rebuilding Iraq into a functioning democracy has proved to be harder than the administration seemed to think in advance. Few were willing to commit the enormous amount of troops required to bring security to the country, and even fewer wanted the U.S. to stay for the long period required to make the nation-building process sustainable. The global hostility toward the Iraq War appeared to have severe consequences, and even Robert Kagan had to admit that the consent of at least Europe would have been preferable to the unilateral option:

Invading Iraq and trying to reconstruct it without the broad benediction of Europe has not been a particularly happy experience, even if the United States eventually succeeds. It is clear that Americans cannot ignore the question of legitimacy, and it is clear that they cannot provide legitimacy for themselves.​[356]​

Thomas Friedman had already expressed these reservations before the war, when he stated that succeeding in Iraq “will require an unrushed process that is viewed as legitimate in Iraq, the region, and the world.”​[357]​
The administration, however, believed that liberal democracy would emerge naturally, and with a minimal effort. In this respect, it proved to be rather naive, and not hindered by any knowledge of the long and complex history that preceded the establishment of liberal democracy in the West. It led Bill Kristol to write that 

... the Bush administration made the big mistake of trying to will the ends without the means. ... This failure in execution has been a big one. It has put the neoconservative ‘project’ at risk. Much more important, it has put American foreign policy at risk, and has endangered our safety and the safety and well-being of the world.​[358]​

This quote suggests that the Bush and neoconservative agendas are not identical. The former, of course, has to deal with the political realities and the demands of the electorate. It should nevertheless hardly come as a surprise that the neoconservatives receive the blame for this “failure in execution.” After all, they have been the ones who have always taken the American legitimacy in the world for granted, and propagated that the American hegemony was “benevolent.” As a result, the U.S. now has to face the trouble in Iraq all by itself, and neoconservatism has unmistakably lost much of its momentum.







Conclusion: enforcing the perpetual peace

Neoconservatism has not remained uncontested throughout its existence, as we have seen, nor have the administrations whose policies it was able to influence. Kissinger contended in 1994 that the multipolar post-Cold War world “must base its order on some concept of equilibrium – an idea with which the United States has never felt comfortable.”​[359]​ Isolationists, who saw the U.S. as a beacon for mankind but not more, and internationalists, who wanted it to crusade for American values around the world, shared a common assumption “that the United States possessed the world’s best system of government, and that the rest of mankind could attain peace and prosperity by abandoning traditional diplomacy and adopting America’s reverence for international law and democracy.”​[360]​ Both schools of thought envision a global order “based on democracy, free trade, and international law,” yet fail to see that other states might dismiss this view as being naive utopianism, Kissinger wrote.​[361]​ After all, such an order has never existed before.
Surely Kissinger’s feelings about this issue have only become stronger in the subsequent twelve years since Diplomacy was published. He might have increased doubts about what he then labeled “America’s reverence for international law,” however. This remark reflects his disapproval of the idealist politics of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, but constitutes only half the truth. If anything, the general sentiment toward international law of the American public and elites throughout the twentieth century has been utter contempt.
	In his rather skeptical study of the American exceptionalism, the British scholar Christopher Coker contends that 

... the past has been used consistently as identity, affirmation or escape according to the needs of the moment. Its lesson is straightforward enough; if Americans could be weaned away from their atavistic attachment to a past that has been largely invented, they might be able to face their own history more honestly with results that might help them better appreciate their less than fairy-tale present.​[362]​


Coker’s message is harsh, and although his book was published in 1989, it remains very up to date, and will probably continue to be. Moreover, he agrees with Kissinger that, if anything, American power is in decline. The realists, thus, at the end of and after the Cold War assume that the United States will have to accept its natural place in the balance of power, and so become “an ordinary country.”​[363]​ The contrast with neoconservative thought could hardly be bigger.
	Those arguing for a more prudent U.S. foreign policy have recently received warm support by a rather important liberal internationalist thinker. For Francis Fukuyama, by many considered a neoconservative throughout the 1990s, lost many of his friends when he stated in his latest book that “I have concluded that neoconservatism, as both a political symbol and a body of thought, has evolved into something that I can no longer support.”​[364]​ The neoconservative notion of a “benevolent hegemony” Fukuyama rejects out of hand: “By the time of the Iraq war, ... the idea that non-Americans would react favorably or at least acquiesce in an American assertion of benevolent hegemony was more a hope than a fact.”​[365]​ He shares with realists a presumption that power will always provoke rival power, naturally leading the world into a new order. As we are currently seeing China and Russia as well as Iran, North Korea, some Latin American countries, and arguably even Europe defying American power, these accounts might well hold true. It seems fair to doubt that the new balance of power will be a unipolar one, even if the current reality suggests otherwise. Like any other hegemonic power in the past, the U.S. might well end up being relegated, in Coker’s words, “to the sidelines of history, from which no country has ever regained centre-stage...”​[366]​
	
The democratic peace, pluralism, and neoconservatism
The two alleged neoconservative features we mentioned in the introduction deserve closer attention. The first is the neoconservative allegiance to the democratic peace theory, put forward first by Immanuel Kant in 1795 and recently further developed by Michael Doyle. Assessing his writings, Doyle certainly seems to have statistics on his side, and especially Europe, previously “the warring [cockpit] of states,”​[367]​ might have established the perpetual peace within its borders. The question, however, is which forces cause this unprecedented state of peace on the continent. Is it really a liberal democratic straitjacket making the European states cooperate peacefully, or is it common strategic and economic interests? If the latter is true, the realists are right. Their arguments are strong. The geopolitical forces during the Cold War were a strong motivator for European cooperation, a cooperation which has also generated an enormous wealth for its population. It now makes little sense for the European countries to start wars against each other. Even Robert Kagan, who states that Europe “is entering ... the realization of Immanuel Kant’s “perpetual peace”,”​[368]​ similarly contends that Europe’s recent “rejection of military power and of its utility as an instrument of international affairs” is a direct product of the American security guarantee.​[369]​ The European countries do not need power to preserve their peace, and the military “free ride” during the Cold War gave them a chance to develop their social democratic model, he writes.​[370]​ Kagan, thus, adopts a quintessential neoconservative stance, in between the liberal notion of the perpetual peace and the realist means to bring it about.
	The ambiguity concerning the democratic peace within the liberal West is hardly the most urgent issue, however. The recent American efforts to inject democracy into a region ruled by illiberal, or even anti-liberal, dictators have posed serious questions as to whether it is at all possible to “spread” democracy. Fareed Zakaria writes that liberalism’s roots are ancient and many, starting with the Roman emperor Constantine’s decision, in the year 330 A.D, to leave the Roman empire’s capital Rome and establish a new one in Byzantium. Constantine’s move led to the first of many periods of tensions between church and state, and marked the beginning of the gradual loss of absolute authority, of both the Pope and Europe’s monarchs. This evolution was reinforced by the rise of capitalism in Britain in the eighteenth century, which rapidly spread to other European countries as well.​[371]​ The climax of this evolutionary democratization process came with the American Declaration of Independence, which stated

... that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness – That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. ... The History of the present King of Great-Britain is a History of repeated Injuries and Usurpations, all having in direct Object the Establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States.​[372]​


The United States, it needs to be said, emerged from a revolution against the British monarch. Its particular origin contributed to its self-perception of being a beacon for mankind, which also explains its strong desire to spread its democratic model. This very short and rather incomplete summary of nearly two thousands years of history, however, should remind us of Mansfield and Snyder’s thesis that states transitioning toward democracy are “more agressive and war prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states.”​[373]​ As Zakaria asks rhetorically, “[What] if democracy produces an Islamic theocracy or something like it?”​[374]​ The recent example of Hamas, the radical terrorist organization, having come to power in the Palestine territories, does not provide us with a hopeful answer. “For people in the West,” Zakaria writes, “democracy means “liberal democracy”:”

a political system marked not only by free and fair elections but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property. But this bundle of freedoms – what might be termed “constitutional liberalism” – has nothing intrinsically to do with democracy and the two have not always gone together, even in the West. [Across the globe,] [d]emocracy is flourishing; liberty is not.​[375]​

This is almost an exact replica of Kant’s notion that a democracy is not the same as what he called a liberal republic. Most likely, it is liberalism which will prove to be the most difficult to inject into the Middle East, for the step toward democracy has proven to be a relatively small one, as shown by the examples of Iraq and Palestine.
Fukuyama complains that his famous work The End of History and the Last Man has been misinterpreted by the neoconservatives: “The End of History is finally an argument for modernization. ... Liberal democracy is one of the by-products of this modernization process, something that becomes a universal aspiration only in the course of historical time.”​[376]​ Although realists would find even this skepticism too optimistic, they share with Fukuyama a strong doubt that democracy can be spread overnight. This doubt is legitimate. At least the notion that an entire region the size of Western Europe can be reshaped according to the American image without a single protest throughout the world or in the Middle East itself, should have been dismissed out of hand. Yet, in Ken Jowitt’s words, “the Bush administration has concluded that Fukuyama’s historical timetable is too laissez-faire and not nearly attentive enough to the levers of historical change.”​[377]​
	The second allegedly neoconservative feature described in the introduction is its hostility toward pluralism. In this respect, the neoconservatives, and the two administrations they have influenced, have allied with the realists. Their skepticism of international law and institutions rests on an intellectual and historical basis which the neoconservative application of the democratic peace theory lacks. Would the world consist of liberal democracies exclusively, pluralism might be effective, the neoconservatives think. The geopolitical reality, however, is that the world lacks a moral consensus to make such an international order work. Since international law works only if its subjects respect the rule of law, it will not work with states that do not even respect the rule of law within their own borders. Although realists would go even further and reject a pluralist global order altogether (even among liberal democracies exclusively), they share with the neoconservatives the view that power is needed to preserve peace, not law.
	It is interesting to philosophize on what would happen at the end of the road: what if a worldwide democratic peace could be established? Would the neoconservatives have the U.S. give up its benevolent hegemony? One would assume they would, since their reservations lie in the analysis that only illiberal regimes would not play by the rules of the game. Yet Kagan and Kristol remark that
	[Theodore] Roosevelt was no utopian; he had contempt for those who believed the international environment could be so transformed as to rid the world of war, put an end to international conflict, and, indeed, put an end to the notion of nationhood itself. Roosevelt was an idealist of a different sort. He did not attempt to wish away the realities of power, but insisted that the defenders of civilization must exercize their power against civilization’s opponents. ‘Warlike intervention by the civilized powers,’ he insisted, ‘would contribute directly to the peace of the world.’​[378]​

This is an outright paradox. They quote with approval Roosevelt’s remark that “intervention by the civilized powers would contribute directly to the peace of the world,” but the notion that the world could be rid of war they call “utopian.” Despite Immanuel Kant’s hopes, Kagan and Kristol are probably right regarding this latter assessment. But then their desire to enforce the perpetual peace – and that is exactly what Roosevelt’s remark would mean in the eyes of contemporary interpreters – also becomes rather implausible. As the neoconservatives would have it, then, the unipolar moment is a permanent one. A benevolent hegemony of the United States will preserve, and perhaps expand, a zone of a perpetual, liberal or democratic peace, but it will never fulfill its destiny. This is liberal internationalism slapped in the face by realism.

Neoconservatism: incomprehension and hostility 
The realist and mainstream-liberal objections to the neoconservative attempts to enforce the perpetual peace are legitimate. Pluralist counter-arguments against the neoconservatives are less so, and raised mainly by European states attempting but to constrain American power, as Kagan contends.​[379]​ Yet if we are to understand neoconservatism’s roots and legacies, we have to search beyond the hostile allegations and misinterpretations that have been raised by many observers during the past few years.
	First, those who argue that the administration lied, that is to say that it deliberately misrepresented facts, in order to gain public support for the Iraq War, underestimate the threat Saddam Hussein had posed in the past. Throughout the 1990s, Saddam unmistakably possessed WMD, and when he forced the U.N inspectors to leave Iraq in 1998, significant parts of his stockpiles were not eliminated. Moreover, the accusation that the administration lied, rests on a mere assumption, for which there is not a single piece of evidence until, arguably, the relevant archives containing administration documents on the war become public. Second, blaming the war on the oil argument similarly does not do sufficient justice to the geopolitical concerns about Saddam’s regime, and it needs to be said that for much of the 1990s American oil companies were seeking to resume trade with Iraq’s regime rather than have the military remove it.​[380]​ Third, the notion that neoconservatives are guided by religion in their desire to confront “evil” around the world, as Halper and Clarke argue in their rather unsympathetic account of neoconservatism, is also a product of flawed analysis.​[381]​ Indeed, George W. Bush has shown to be a spokesman for the religious right in his country, but the neoconservatives surely just base their convictions on a strong belief that democracy is a force for peace and the most legitimate form of government.
Finally, the argument that the neoconservatives, and consequently the administration, served Jewish interests rather than American, leaves room for many questions. First of all, it should be noted that none of the key members of the first Bush administration were initially neoconservatives themselves (nor became so afterwards, for that matter), and it is rather unlikely that these experienced politicians allowed a few officials and public intellectuals to force them into adopting a policy they would have never pursued otherwise. The attitudes of Rumsfeld and Cheney toward Iraq were well known long before 9/11. Second, some of the neoconservatives’ pro-Israeli sympathies might be explained by their Jewish roots, but many of them are, in fact, not Jewish. Even more important, it does not explain their preoccupation with the dictatorial regimes in Yugoslavia and North Korea, unless these countries would indeed constitute a threat to Israel. Observers could have easily noticed what really connects the neoconservatives with the Jewish state; it is the only liberal democratic state in a deeply troubled and unstable region, ruled by anti-liberal, WMD-seeking dictators, who have in the past decades continuously defied both the U.S. and Israel. As true liberals, the neoconservatives provide warm moral support for the equally liberal Jewish state.

The American Century
Ultimately, this thesis attempted to deal with the question whether the two alleged features of neoconservatism and the Bush administration – their allegiance to the democratic peace theory and their dislike of pluralism – constitute a revolution in American foreign policy. The answer is that they do not. The twentieth century has witnessed an unprecedented rise to power of a nation, economically, culturally, and militarily, to such an extent that its impact is felt all over the world. As the United States was rapidly industrializing from the nineteenth century onward, and new technologies implied that its stubborn isolationism was no longer maintainable, administrations were forced to deal with the question as to how their country should respond to the changing status quo in the world.
	The “American Century,” as it has been labeled by many, started with President Theodore Roosevelt, whose keyword was “preparedness.” As we have seen, Roosevelt was deeply suspicious of international law, and desired to secure peace and stability through American strength. His presidency went along with an unprecedented naval buildup and with the sense that the American exceptionalism brought with it an imperative to spread civilization, thereby acting “in the interest of humanity at large.”​[382]​ Kissinger, and many observers with him, have seen this as nothing but nice rhetoric, and contend that Roosevelt but held a desire for the U.S. to assume a natural role in the new global balance of power. Yet today’s neoconservatives have equally praised him for aspiring “to the greatness of America.”​[383]​ For Kagan and Kristol, the former President was not a realist, but an idealist who shared their realistic presumptions about the nature of man and the international order.
	The first who directly spoke about the merits of democracy (as opposed to “civilization”) was Woodrow Wilson. Educated in history and political sciences, Wilson held distinguished ideas on liberal democracy, and felt that it was time to spread the American form of government to the world, thereby spreading international peace as well. Old-fashioned European conduct of foreign policy he considered an anachronism. As Fukuyama writes, “Wilson sought to establish a democratic peace and promote the spread of liberal democracy through the creation of a liberal international legal order based on the League of Nations.”​[384]​ This President, therefore, was arguably the first American neo-Kantian. Similar to the philosopher, he thought that liberal states would display self-constraint in their behavior on the international scene. Kant, of course, would have feared that the League of Nations might also end up being a tyrannical world government, but their liberal internationalism was fairly identical, and would presumably be labeled “utopianism” by Kagan and Kristol.
	That these neoconservatives prefer Roosevelt above Wilson is easy to explain. Roosevelt was prepared to use power to punish the Germans for their actions when World War I started, whereas Wilson wanted the U.S. to remain on the sidelines. The country’s military buildup proceeded only hesitantly, even as the war was proceeding in full speed on the other side of the Atlantic. Although Wilson stood up in defense of the democracies, he did so rather hesitantly, whereas Roosevelt had been eager to spread civilization by force, notably in Latin America. At the same time, Roosevelt despised international law, and his friend and ideological peer Henry Cabot Lodge lobbied hard to have the Versailles Treaty rejected by the U.S. Senate. Although most observers throughout the twenty-first century have regarded Roosevelt above all as a realist, the President has left an unmistakable influence on the neoconservative brand of liberal internationalism.
	In any case, Wilson’s strive for world peace indeed proved utopian, as the world descended into an even more destructive war a mere twenty years later. Great leadership was again required to convince a rather hesitant public that Europe’s war was also threatening American security. As it was, Franklin Delano Roosevelt sold the American intervention in World War II as a war between democracy and tyranny. “No realistic American,” he argued, “can expect from a dictator’s peace international generosity, or return of true independence, or world disarmament, or freedom of expression, or freedom of religion – or even good business.”​[385]​ These words, of course, also implied that one could expect such behavior from democracies, and, therefore, revealed a belief, by also this President, in the democratic peace. Roosevelt saw it as his destiny to defend democracy around the world.
When the Allied powers had defeated the German enemy in an existential struggle, he initially sought to secure world peace by having all nations disarm and adhere to a military hegemony by the Four Policemen. This scheme met much public resistance in the U.S, but would also never have worked in the absence of a liberal consensus among the victorious powers. The outcome was a universal organization in which these countries plus France became permanent, veto-wielding members of the Security Council, and which, like the League of Nations before it, was supposed to end all realist conduct of international affairs as it had been practiced for centuries. Unless the Security Council agreed that international peace and security were threatened or violated, acts of war were illegal. Since the U.N. member states would provide the organization with its own forces, many believed that, contrary to the League, it would be able to secure world peace, even though its top council lacked any moral consensus. It was the international equivalent of liberal democracy, but many of its members were neither liberal nor democratic. For Roosevelt, the U.N. was also the next best option, but he nevertheless thought that its member states would display self-constraint in their international affairs, a belief he shared with Kant. This belief was remarkable enough, given the experience of the 1920s and 1930s.
Roosevelt was succeeded by a President who held much contempt for the new organization. As the relations between the superpowers were quickly turning sour, a global, bipolar balance of power emerged, and Harry Truman conducted a foreign policy on realist premises. The containment policy, developed by George Kennan, sought to counter the Soviet threat with power politics, not international law. The economic Marshall Plan was mainly perceived to be a stragic manoeuver, and NATO was the sort of military alliance which the U.N. in theory had rendered obsolete. Yet even Truman appealed to the view that there was a vast difference between the international behavior of democracies and dictatorships. Just as Kennan put forward in his X-article, Truman noted that “totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.”​[386]​ Like the Roosevelts and Wilson, Truman the realist expressed a belief in the democratic peace.
Undoubtedly, these Presidents were, for a large part, merely expressing such views as rhetoric, in order to appeal to a public opinion and subsequently pursue rather cynical state interests. Yet their impact on later generations of politicians and observers should not be underestimated, as we have seen in Kagan and Kristol’s admiration of Theodore Roosevelt. After all, the neoconservatives were aiming to provide a counterweight against the more radical New Left, which had sacrificed the American exceptionalism and adopted moral relativism and multiculturalism instead. The diverse neoconservative intellectuals shared a common belief in the greatness of American liberal democracy and the unreliability of totalitarian regimes. These ideas subsequently had a big influence on the foreign policy of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, who similarly came to express their ardent support for the American exceptionalism with much self-confidence. As we have seen, Michael Doyle also adopted, and further developed, the view that liberal democracy is the best guarantor for international peace and security.
Reagan received much criticism by the neoconservatives when he embarked upon serious arms reduction talks with the Soviet Union. Yet he started his presidency engaging in enormous increases in defense spending and deploying new nuclear missiles. In an address to the National Association of Evangelicals, he called the Soviet Union an “evil empire,” accommodation of which was “simpleminded appeasement or wishful thinking.”​[387]​ He initiated the Strategic Defense Initiative, and he engaged in a struggle against communism all over the world, backing anti-communist regimes and rebels. “The reality is that we must find peace through strength,” the President noted.​[388]​ This peace was likely to be a Western liberal peace led by the United States, leaving no place for tyrannical regimes. The way to achieve it, Reagan thought, was to outrun the Soviet enemy strategically and eliminate it altogether. His policies proved very effective, although the domestic condition of the Soviet Union already left little room for improvement. Gorbachev came to power knowing that he had to negotiate with the Americans from a position of extreme weakness, and his domestic reforms ultimately led to the demise of his empire.
The Reagan administration shared with neoconservatives a contempt for pluralism. As Jeane Kirkpatrick accounted disappointedly, “the democratic structure of the UN guaranteed that the views and values of new nations entering the UN would be quickly reflected in the organization. And many of those views and values were very different.”​[389]​ International law, she and other officials feared, would not work without a worldwide liberal homogeneity. This was a fair conclusion, which was also expressed by Reagan himself.
George W. Bush came to power in 2001 with an administration consisting of some neoconservatives, but these persons were outnumbered by realists. The foreign policy it conducted previous to 9/11 was hardly based on the notion of benevolent hegemony or enlightened self-interest. Power and the willingness to exercise it were essential to the administration, but it should not be wielded for “trivial” causes.​[390]​ The result was the more humble, realist foreign policy approach of pursuing limited national interests. It led the neoconservatives to criticize Bush for suffering from a lack of liberal internationalism. In fact, during the first nine months of his presidency, the neoconservatives only appreciated his utter dislike of international law, and his consequent withdrawal from the Kyoto, ABM, and ICC treaties.
Prior to the terrorist attacks, the administration had retreated the U.S. from internationalism into realism, and had adopted an attitude toward pluralism which was remarkably consistent with that of many other presidencies in American history. The events of September 11, 2001, however, made clear to many key officials that a lack of freedom and democracy were the ultimate causes for Islamic terrorism. In other words, 9/11 marked the administration’s return to the liberal-internationalist premise that spreading democracy over the world would produce international peace and security. This renewed allegiance to the democratic peace theory presumably came about through the influence of neoconservative officials such as Wolfowitz and Perle, but implied nothing more than a return to the historical appeal of the American exceptionalism. Daalder and Lindsay have labeled these policies the “Bush revolution in foreign policy,”​[391]​ but they actually have strong roots in the American foreign policy tradition, and were, therefore, hardly revolutionary.
What did revolutionize was the nation’s perception of strategic threats and challenges after the al-Qaeda attacks. These had shown that the United States was vulnerable, and they were, moreover, perpetrated not by states but by individuals. Besides going after the people directly responsible, the administration grasped the inflammability of the Middle Eastern status quo, and neoconservatives provided a coherent intellectual framework for dealing with it. Illiberal dictators feed anti-Americanism and often harbor or support terrorism, their argument went. Therefore, replacing these regimes with liberal democracies would eliminate the fuel for terrorism. Remaking the Middle East, in other words, would be good for both America and the Middle East itself. It was a quintessential neoconservative conception of the geopolitical reality of the twenty-first century.
It is hardly surprising, furthermore, that the administration undertook little efforts to win international support for these rather bold policies. After all, NATO consensus and U.N. mandates would but compromise its own strategic planning, and if anything, a lack of international support should not prevent the U.S. from “going it alone.” The perception that George W. Bush was a unilateralist was reinforced by the fact that the European allies lacked the military equipment to be of any significant support to the U.S, and that many of their citizens felt that the “root causes” of terrorism were American foreign policy and poverty rather than illiberal dictators. As a result, Europe was left to “do the dishes” in Afghanistan, as the familiar expression has it, after U.S. forces had completed major combat there. In the case of Iraq, a gap in strategic perceptions led the NATO allies to drift even further apart. For the administration, removing Saddam from power was a number one priority, which it would not compromise. The horrors of 9/11 had clearly left their marks, and it led the U.S. to adopt a militant form of imposing its liberal values upon the world.
If spreading democracy has never before been important to the United States, however, or if conditions in the international system are still as stable as they have been throughout the Cold War, the alleged revolution might be a real thing indeed. Blaming these “new” ways all on the administration, however, does not do sufficient justice to the historical context in which they have come about. Indeed, extraordinary times have often led to extraordinary measures. Neoconservatism may have received the pejorative nickname “liberalism on steroids,”​[392]​ but those steroids were certainly for a large part administered by 9/11. Moreover, steroids or not, neoconservatism is still liberalism, a school of thought that has been present in American foreign policy since the birth of the United States, and has been dominant for almost a hundred years now. Unilateralism, finally, is not strictly a revolutionary new aspect of American foreign policy either, as we have seen in this thesis. It is the geopolitical forces which have changed, and consequently have influenced an administration that is well aware of the historical perception of America’s destiny.
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